WHO’S IN CHARGE? DOES THE PRESIDENT
HAVE DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY OVER AGENCY
REGULATORY DECISIONS?
Robert V. Percival*
Most regulatory statutes specify that agency heads rather than the
President shall make regulatory decisions . 1 Yet for more than four decades
every President has established some program to require pre-decisional
review and clearance of agency regulatory decisions, usually conducted by
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).2 On January 18, 2011,
President Barack Obama joined his seven predecessors in expressly
endorsing regulatory review when he signed Executive Order 13,563. 3
President Obama’s regulatory review program generally emulates those
of his two most recent predecessors, relying on OMB’s Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to review only the most
significant agency rulemaking actions.4 Although this form of presidential
oversight of rulemaking is now well established, an important, unresolved
question is whether the President has the authority to dictate the substance
of regulatory decisions entrusted by statute to agency heads. While
proponents of a unitary executive argue in favor of presidential directive
authority, 5 this article demonstrates that each President’s regulatory review
program has disclaimed such authority, even though OIRA at times has
tried to displace agency decisionmaking.
* Robert Stanton Professor of Law and the Director of the Environmental Law Program,
University of Maryland School of Law. The author would like to express his appreciation to
Peter Hogge, Esther Houseman, Megan Marzec, Molly Madden, and Helena Mastrogianis
for their outstanding research assistance with this Article.
1. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006) (specifying that the
Administrator of EPA shall promulgate and regularly review and revise national ambient air
quality standards for air pollutants).
2. The history of presidential review of rulemaking is comprehensively reviewed in
Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1991) [hereinafter
Percival, Checks Without Balance], and Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the
Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001) [hereinafter
Percival, Presidential Management].
3. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
4. See id. § 1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. at 3821. President Obama’s executive order
supplements and reaffirms the existing regulatory review program established by President
Bill Clinton under Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), and continued by President
George W. Bush. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008); Exec. Order No. 13,258,
3 C.F.R. 204 (2003).
5. See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008).
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After describing three principal views on whether the President has
directive authority, this Article discusses the constitutional foundations of
this debate. It then reviews the history of presidential oversight of agencies
and its implications for the debate over directive authority. The Article
concludes by explaining why, even if the President has unfettered removal
authority over the heads of non-independent agencies, it matters that this
removal power does not imply the power to control decision making
entrusted by law to agency heads.
I. THREE VIEWS OF PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY
There are three principal approaches to the question of whether the
President has directive authority over regulatory decisions entrusted by
statute to agency heads. First, the unitary executive theory holds that
presidential directive authority is constitutionally required (unitary
executive approach).6 The second approach argues that statutes entrusting
regulatory decisions to agency heads should be interpreted to grant the
President directive authority unless they expressly restrict it (“directive
authority” as an “interpretive principle”). 7 The third approach, which the
author has advocated, is that the President does not have directive authority
unless a statute expressly gives it to him (“not-so-unitary executive” or
“disunitary executive” approach). 8
Proponents of the unitary executive theory view it as self-evident that the
President should have directive authority over agency heads.9 They infer
this authority from the President’s ability to remove the heads of nonindependent agencies, and they argue that independent agencies are
unconstitutional. This approach was advocated in Justice Scalia’s lone
dissent in Morrison v. Olson 10 in 1988 when the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Ethics in Government Act that limited the
President’s ability to remove independent counsels investigating allegations
of crime by high executive officers.11 Even though Morrison represents a
clear rejection of the unitary executive theory, Professors Steven G.
Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo have argued vociferously for its revival.
In their book The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington
to Bush 12 they maintain that the Vesting Clause of Article II of the
Constitution, which vests the executive power in the President, “includes
the power to remove and direct all lower-level executive officials.” 13
Reviewing the history of presidential oversight of the executive, Calabresi
and Yoo claim that no President has acquiesced to any legislative or judicial

6. See id.
7. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2330
(2001).
8. See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2.
9. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5.
10. 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 696–97 (majority opinion).
12. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5.
13. Id. at 3–4.
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encroachment on the unitary executive, despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s
upholding of the constitutionality of Congress’s creating independent
agencies and of placing limitations on the President’s power to remove their
leaders. 14
In the two decades since Morrison was decided, the Court has become
more sympathetic to claims of broad presidential removal power. Last year,
by a 5–4 majority, the Court invalidated a restriction on the President’s
ability to remove members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 15 The Act provided
that the members of the PCAOB could only be removed for cause by the
Securities and Exchange Commission whose members themselves can only
be removed by the President for cause.16 Although the Court determined
that this double for-cause restriction on the President’s removal authority
violated Article II’s vesting of executive power in the President, it did not
question the constitutionality of independent agencies whose members can
only be removed for cause. 17
The second approach to the question of presidential directive authority
was proposed by Elena Kagan, prior to becoming a Supreme Court Justice.
In an influential article entitled Presidential Administration, Kagan argued
that where Congress has not acted expressly to restrict the President’s
ability to direct an agency decision, regulatory statutes should be interpreted
to permit the President to do so. 18 She argued that such an interpretive
principle (“presuming an undifferentiated presidential control of executive
agency officials”) 19 is a more accurate interpretation of congressional intent
when Congress has not restricted the President’s removal powers. As
discussed below, precisely the contrary assumption prevails now and did at
the time Congress enacted most of the current federal regulatory statutes.20
Because it was thought that the President did not have the authority to
dictate regulatory decisions entrusted to agency heads by law, all of the
executive orders establishing regulatory review programs expressly
disclaimed such authority. 21 While OIRA has tried at times, particularly
during the Reagan Administration, to dictate the substance of regulatory

14. See generally Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey’s Executor
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
15. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151
(2010).
16. Id. at 3148.
17. The Court held that dual for-cause limitations on the removal of members of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) unconstitutionally infringed on
presidential power, but it declined an invitation to invalidate PCAOB on constitutional
grounds. Id. at 3138.
18. See generally Kagan, supra note 7.
19. Id. at 2328.
20. See, e.g., Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 965; Richard H. Pildes
& Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995);
Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Power To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 263, 270–99 (2006); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 649 (1984).
21. See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 965 n.7.
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decisions entrusted to agencies by statute, it was quick to disclaim such
directive authority whenever its actions were challenged. 22
Ten years ago, in a detailed historical review of presidential oversight of
agencies, I described a third vision of our constitutional scheme as
reflecting a “not-so-unitary executive” in which the President does not have
directive authority over decisions entrusted by statute to agency heads.23
Although I acknowledge that the President’s ability to remove nonindependent agency heads at will gives him enormous power to persuade
them to accede to his wishes, I argue that presidential directive authority
cannot be inferred from the removal power. If an agency head refuses to
accommodate the President’s policy preferences, there is no constitutional
problem with the President removing him from office. But this does not
imply that the President has the authority to dictate the substance of agency
decisions that regulatory statutes entrust to agency heads. 24
In Part II, after reviewing the constitutional dimensions of the debate
over presidential directive authority, this Article discusses how statutes
granting regulatory authority to the executive should be interpreted. Part III
then reviews the historical record relevant to directive authority. It notes
that every President who established a regulatory review program
disclaimed directive authority in the context of such review to avoid
undermining its legality. The Article concludes in Part IV by explaining
why the answer to the directive authority question matters even though the
President’s removal power greatly diminishes the number of incidents in
which agency heads will be bold enough to defy the President. As the
article explains, history demonstrates that the absence of presidential
directive authority can serve as an important check on presidential abuses of
power for political ends.
II. DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY, THE CONSTITUTION, AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,25 the President’s authority over
the agencies under him flows from Article II of the Consitution, but can be
channeled—within limits—by congressional enactment. As I discuss
below, however, neither of these sources supports presidential directive
authority.
A. Directive Authority and the Constitution
By now the contours of the constitutional debate over presidential
directive authority are well known. Article II of the Constitution vests the
22. See Robert V. Percival, Rediscovering the Limits of the Regulatory Review Authority
of the Office of Management and Budget, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,007, 10,019–20 (1987).
23. Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2.
24. Id. at 1003–06.
25. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
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executive power in the President.26 At the Constitutional Convention the
framers rejected a proposal to share the executive power among the
members of an executive council in order to create a single, effective, and
accountable chief executive. 27 Proponents of the unitary executive theory
maintain that Article II’s vesting clause and the rejection of a plural
executive should be interpreted to give the President both removal at will
and directive authority over all executive branch officers, rendering
independent agencies unconstitutional.
Other features of the constitutional text cut against the notion that the
President has directive authority over decisions entrusted by statute to the
heads of executive agencies. The establishment of executive agencies is left
entirely to legislation in Article II, Section 2, 28 leaving it to Congress to
define “the functions, powers, and duties of the heads of such
Departments . . . .” 29 Article I, Section 8’s famous Necessary and Proper
Clause refers to “Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof,” suggesting that
there is no constitutional barrier to Congress vesting powers in agency
heads. 30 When the first U.S. Congress, comprised of many members who
were delegates to the Constitutional Convention, established the
Department of Treasury as the second federal agency, it directed the
Treasury Secretary to submit reports directly to Congress, and it reserved
the right to require information from him unfiltered by the President.31
The President’s power under Article II, Section 2 to “require the Opinion,
in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices,” implies
presidential supervisory authority over agency heads.32 However, if the
framers deemed it necessary to make this power explicit, it would seem
strange not to mention expressly an even more significant directive
authority. Article II, Section 2 also provides the President with authority to
appoint officers of the U.S. “by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate.” This serves as an important check on presidential power that is
inconsistent with the notion of presidential directive authority. If the
President can control the substance of every agency decision, why would it
be necessary to have the Senate confirm his nominees to lead the agencies?
The Constitution is silent on presidential removal powers. The first
constitutional debate in Congress, undertaken when Congress created the
Department of Foreign Affairs to be the first federal agency, occurred over
the question of whether the President could remove cabinet officers without
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.”).
27. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 34.
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the President power to appoint officers to
offices “which shall be established by Law.”).
29. JAMES HART, THE ORDINANCE MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 189 (1925).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
31. JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA: 1789–1801, at 26–27 (1960).
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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obtaining the approval of the Senate.33 Vice President John Adams broke a
tie in the Senate in July 1789 to resolve the issue in favor of not requiring
Senate approval before the President could remove the Secretary of
Treasury. 34 Major battles between Congress and the President over the
removal power occurred at various times throughout history, resulting in the
impeachment of President Andrew Johnson in 1868, 35 but it now seems
settled that the President can remove at will the heads of executive
agencies, save that Congress can require cause for removals of the heads of
independent agencies.
The Take Care Clause of Article II, Section 3 requires that the President
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” This clause also is
frequently cited as support for a unitary executive with presidential
directive authority. However, in 1823 Attorney General William Wirt
issued an opinion declaring that the Take Care Clause had precisely the
opposite effect. “If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to
perform a duty, not only is that officer bound to perform it . . . he would not
only be not taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he would
be violating them himself.” 36 Wirt maintained that if a statute provides for
a decision to be made by an agency head, the Take Care Clause does not
allow the President “to perform the duty, but to see that the officer assigned
by law performs his duty faithfully.” 37
Thirty-five years later, a subsequent Attorney General, Caleb Cushing,
rejected this view, as I have noted elsewhere. 38 Cushing believed that “no
Head of Department can lawfully perform an official act against the will of
the President; and that will is by the Constitution to govern the performance
of all such acts.” 39 But Cushing noted that when a statute provides for an
action to be taken by an agency head, the President must act through the
official designated by Congress when the President exercises his
discretion. 40
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Marbury v. Madison 41 and Kendall v.
United States 42 establish that there are certain “ministerial” duties given to
agency heads by statute with which the President cannot interfere. In
Marbury Chief Justice John Marshall declared that:
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his
33. See generally Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 1021 (2006).
34. MARGARET C.S. CHRISTMAN, THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: 1789–1801, at 136
(1989).
35. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the
Second Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 667, 746–58 (2003).
36. The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 625 (1823).
37. Id. at 626 (emphasis omitted).
38. See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 977.
39. Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 469–
70 (1855).
40. Id. at 468.
41. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
42. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
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own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political
character and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of
these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his
authority, and in conformity with his orders. 43

However, Chief Justice Marshall also stated:
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other
duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the
rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is
so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and
cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others. 44

In Kendall the Court rejected the argument that the Take Care Clause gave
the President power to countermand a legal requirement that the postmaster
general make a payment required by statute.45 The Court observed that
“[t]o contend, that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws
faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel
construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.” 46 This helps
clarify a proposition that should be self-evident from the text of the
Constitution. Whatever the scope of the President’s directive authority, he
cannot legally use it to direct a result that is contrary to law. One
implication of this could be that if an agency head is acting contrary to law,
the President’s responsibilities under the Take Care Clause may require him
to oppose the agency decision. Certainly a President who removes agency
heads for failing to follow the law is on sound constitutional ground, while
a President who seeks to require an agency head to take an illegal action to
benefit a campaign contributor would not be.
In Kendall the Court also declared that the Vesting Clause 47 did not give
the President directive authority:
The executive power is vested in a President; and so far as his powers
are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other
department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the
impeaching power. But it by no means follows, that every officer in
every branch of that department is under the exclusive direction of the
President. Such a principle, we apprehend, is not, and certainly cannot be
claimed by the President.
There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the
executive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the
President. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot
impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which
is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution;
and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject
to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President. And

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165–66.
Id. at 166.
Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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this is emphatically the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere
ministerial character. 48

As Professor Kevin Stack ably argues, Marbury and Kendall clearly rule
out presidential directive authority when agency officials have been
required by Congress to perform non-discretionary, ministerial duties, but
they leave open the question of whether such authority exists in the context
of discretionary decisions entrusted to agency heads. 49 Although agencies
today retain considerable discretion in making most regulatory decisions,
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) subjects them to judicial review
for fidelity to law, indicating that they do not fall within the class of
Marbury’s unreviewable political judgments.
B. Directive Authority and Statutory Interpretation
Even if the Constitution does not support the unitary executive theory,
proponents of directive authority as an interpretive principle maintain that
such authority should be inferred from legislation that does not expressly
disclaim it. 50 Now-Justice Kagan supports this view by comparing
delegations of regulatory authority to independent agencies with
delegations to other executive agencies.51 She argues that delegations to
independent agencies reflect a congressional intent to insulate certain
decisions from presidential influence because the President cannot remove
heads of independent agencies at will.52 Conversely, she maintains that
delegations to agency heads who are removable by the President at will
should be interpreted as reflecting an intent to give the President directive
authority. 53 Yet some statutes specify that the President is to make certain
decisions, while providing that other decisions are to be made by agency
heads. 54 Following Attorney General Cushing’s interpretation, Kagan
maintains that these delegations should be viewed only as establishing who
has initial responsibility for the decision, without foreclosing the President
from assuming ultimate responsibility for decisions initially entrusted to
agency heads.
I previously have responded to this argument by noting that some
regulatory statutes expressly specify the circumstances under which the
President can suspend decisions made by agency heads.55 Calling these
delegations “mixed agency-president delegations,” Professor Stack has
demonstrated that they have been a not-infrequent feature of legislation
48. Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610.
49. Stack, supra note 20, at 273.
50. See generally Kagan, supra note 7.
51. Id. at 2327.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 2327–28.
54. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). Section 104 authorizes the President to direct actions
responding to releases of hazardous substances, while section 102 requires the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to determine what quantities of
hazardous substances trigger response authorities.
55. Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 1008.
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since the early days of the republic continuing until today. 56 These include
conditional delegations that “expressly condition the grant of authority to an
official on the oversight of the President” and agency-specific delegations
that specify “the agent through whom the President must act.” 57 Traditional
principles of statutory interpretation dictate that if Congress deems it
necessary in some circumstances to specify when the President may
exercise authority to override an agency decision, such authority should not
be inferred when Congress has not so specified. 58 Indeed, the case for
inferring that Congress meant something different when it chose not to
mention the President or to grant him express directive authority in
regulatory statutes is compelling enough to suggest that there is no
ambiguity justifying application of principles of constitutional avoidance.
III. UPDATING THE HISTORICAL RECORD ON DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY
In previous articles I have reviewed in detail the history of presidential
review of rulemaking 59 and the history of presidential management of the
administrative state through the first year of the George W. Bush
Administration. 60 Two of the principal proponents of the unitary executive
theory—Stephen Calabresi and Christopher Yoo—subsequently have
published a lengthy history examining how each President in U.S. history
has asserted authority over the executive branch.61 Calabresi and Yoo
assert that this history demonstrates that “all of our nation’s Presidents have
believed in the theory of the unitary executive.”62 While they acknowledge
that the judiciary has confirmed the constitutionality of independent
agencies, they invite the judiciary to reconsider, maintaining that
“presidential nonacquiescence to congressional claims of power to create
independent entities in the executive branch renders congressional historical
practice irrelevant as a guidepost to constitutional interpretation.” 63
Calabresi and Yoo focus most of their historical analysis on presidential
removal powers, while maintaining that directive authority necessarily
follows from their unitary executive theory. 64 While the breadth of the
book’s historical review is impressive, their effort to conform history to
their theory results at times in important omissions or unwarranted “spin”
on certain historical events. After reviewing these instances below, the
article updates the historical record relevant to directive authority from the
dawn of the George W. Bush Administration to the present. This update
includes efforts by the Bush Administration to force the U.S.
56. Stack, supra note 20, at 276–84.
57. Id. at 278, 282.
58. Id. at 284.
59. Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2.
60. Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2.
61. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id. at 8.
64. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“While it is certainly true that presidential control over the
executive branch is a complex phenomenon, this book seeks to show that it would be a great
mistake to underestimate the importance of the removal power.”).
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to veto California’s program to
control emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), to prevent the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) from licensing “Plan B” emergency
contraception for non-prescription use, and Vice President Richard
Cheney’s efforts to force the Office of the Attorney General to approve the
issuance of a national security directive on warrantless surveillance that
Justice Department officials believed to be illegal. In the first two
controversies White House pressure persuaded agency heads to make
decisions of questionable legality, both of which have now been overturned.
Vice President Cheney’s efforts faltered when resignation threats by legal
officials in the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the Central Intelligence Agency ultimately forced significant changes in the
directive. Finally, the article examines President Barack Obama’s issuance
of directives to agency heads, including directives to increase fuel economy
standards and to reconsider EPA’s veto of California’s regulation of GHG
emissions from motor vehicles.
One initial quibble with Calabresi and Yoo’s history concerns their
account of the origins of presidential review of rulemaking. Calabresi and
Yoo maintain that presidential review of agency regulatory actions started
with the Administration of President Lyndon Johnson. They maintain that
Johnson “pioneered what would emerge as a critical device in allowing the
President to control the execution of the law when he began using the
oversight responsibilities of the Bureau of the Budget to influence the
They attribute
development of important agency regulations.”65
unwarranted significance to this alleged “fact” by asserting that it,
combined with the use of regulatory review by all subsequent
administrations, “undercuts any suggestion that OMB review of regulations
reflects an ideological slant in either direction.”66
While it is true that all Presidents since Richard Nixon have employed
some form of a regulatory review program, the initial impetus for such
review was an effort by President Nixon to curb regulatory actions by the
newly created EPA. 67 The only source Calabresi and Yoo cite for the
assertion that regulatory review originated with the Johnson Administration
is an interview with former OMB official Jim Tozzi, cited in another
article. 68 Yet Tozzi himself subsequently has told interviewers that
“[r]eviews of regulations began when Richard Nixon created the
Environmental Protection Agency.” 69
65. Id. at 342.
66. Id. at 13.
67. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 129–38.
68. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 342 n.19; Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of
Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 9 & n.19 (1984)
(citing Interview with Jim Tozzi, former Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Deputy Administrator (June 14, 1983)).
69. Dan Davidson, Jim Tozzi:
Nixon’s “Nerd” Turns Regulations Watchdog,
FEDERALTIMES.COM (Nov 11, 2002), http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20021111_fedtimestozzi.pdf. During the Johnson Administration, Tozzi was employed by the Office of
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A. Regulatory Review in the Nixon Administration
The origin of OMB review of regulations more properly can be
understood to date from May 21, 1971 when OMB Director George Shultz
sent a letter to EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus asserting authority
to review and clear EPA regulations that were likely to impose significant
costs or create additional demands on the federal budget. 70 EPA was
directed to submit proposed regulations to OMB thirty days before
publication and to include analyses of the regulation’s objectives,
alternatives, and estimates of costs and benefits.71 This program later was
expanded into what became known as “Quality of Life” (QOL) review.72
Although the QOL program required that proposed regulations be submitted
to OMB, who then circulated them to other agencies for comment, 73 it is
significant that OMB was made responsible only for mediating conflicts
between agencies. OMB was not given ultimate decision making
authority. 74 Indeed, a proposal that would have allowed OMB to exercise
directive authority was rejected because of concerns about its legality. 75
While nominally applicable to all executive agencies, EPA was the only
agency routinely subjected to QOL review. 76 The review process became a
convenient vehicle for industry representatives who were members of
President Nixon’s National Industrial Pollution Control Council (NIPCC) to
try to influence regulatory decisions. NIPCC consisted of sixty-three
corporate executives appointed by Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans who
met in secret with Stans and other federal officials to air complaints about
impending regulatory actions. 77 It had been established on April 9, 1970
Budget’s Systems Analysis Group that argued for expanding reviews of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers’ budget to include review of Corps regulations. See Jim Tozzi,
Commentary
of
Dr.
Alan
Schmid’s
Paper,
THECRE.COM,
http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/TozziAnalOfEconomicsOfRulemaking.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2011). The members of the Office of Budget’s Systems Analysis Group later
helped establish and manage President Nixon’s Quality of Life Review process, which was
the first presidential regulatory review program. See id.
70. GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN’S REGULATORY
DILEMMA 47–48 (1984).
71. See Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004,
90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 658–59 (2005).
72. See id.
73. MARC K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS & STEPHEN R. THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 37 (1990).
74. See Yoo et al., supra note 71, at 659.
75. EADS & FIX, supra note 70, at 48.
76. See Yoo et al., supra note 71, at 659.
77. The stated purpose of the National Industrial Pollution Control Council (NIPCC)
was to “‘allow businessmen to communicate regularly with the President, the Council on
Environmental Quality and other governmental officials and private organizations’” with
respect to regulatory initiatives. Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 130
(quoting Statement on Establishing the National Industrial Pollution Control Council, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 344, 344 (Apr. 9, 1970)). NIPCC’s meetings were not publicly announced and were
closed to the public. See id. at 168–70. For example, after discovering that NIPCC would be
meeting on October 14, 1970, representatives of ten consumer and environmental groups
showed up at the Department of Commerce and sought to attend the meeting. The
Commerce Department not only refused to allow them to attend the meeting, but it also
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through the issuance of Executive Order 11,523. 78 The QOL review
process has been described as marked by “heated arguments between EPA
and the Department of Commerce, its principal antagonist, with . . . reviews
. . . [focused on] industry-prepared information presented by the Commerce
Department.” 79
In the early days of the EPA, fierce battles occurred between the agency
and the White House. As I have noted in my previous scholarship,80
Deputy Administrator John R. Quarles, Jr. reports that he was summoned to
the White House in an effort to force the EPA to drop one of its first
enforcement actions against a company whose management had supported
President Nixon. 81 After the incident leaked to the press and a
congressional hearing was held, the White House backed down and
Administrator Ruckelshaus pledged to resign “if environmental decisions
are overruled because of political considerations.”82 Responding to charges
at a congressional hearing that the QOL review process had forced the EPA
to weaken regulations implementing the Clean Air Act, EPA Administrator
William Ruckelshaus asserted that he, and not OMB, had made the final
decision about the regulations.83 Ruckelshaus vociferously argued that
Executive Office officials were not making decisions for EPA and “[i]f they
were, I would be breaking the law, and I would not function as
Administrator of this Agency if I let them do so.” 84 To reinforce
Ruckelshaus’s claim that OMB lacked directive authority, OMB Director
George Shultz advised the committee in writing that “EPA has final
authority on plans for implementation of air quality standards under the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970.” 85 These incidents powerfully indicate
that it was well understood that the President lacked directive authority over
agency regulatory decisions.

refused their request to provide a transcript of it. See E.W. Kenworthy, U.S. Pollution
Control Panel Bars Environmental and Consumer Observers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1970, at
40. Commerce Department officials refused reporters’ request for a press conference. See
Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra, at 169. The NIPCC, however, subsequently
released summary minutes of some of its meetings. See Implementation of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of
the S. Comm. on Pub. Works, 92d Cong. 583–94 (1972) [hereinafter Hearings]. These
summaries, however, amounted to little more than “a skeletal outline of the issues discussed,
evidently thoroughly sanitized.” William H. Rodgers, Jr., The National Industrial Pollution
Control Council: Advise or Collude?, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 719, 727 (1972). The
members of the NIPCC apparently edited the draft summaries extensively “with the
consequence that all damaging, and some useful, information has disappeared from the
public record.” Id.
78. Exec. Order No. 11,523, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1966–1970).
79. EADS & FIX, supra note 70, at 49.
80. Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 135.
81. See JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 58–76 (1976).
82. Id. at 68–70.
83. Hearings, supra note 77, at 325 (testimony of William Ruckelshaus).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 338.
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Disputes between EPA and the White House were so heated that
Administrator Ruckelshaus insisted as a condition for remaining EPA
Administrator after the 1972 election that he receive written assurance from
the President that the EPA Administrator retained the ultimate authority for
EPA policy decisions. 86 President Nixon verbally agreed to this, but EPA
“bargained in vain with OMB” to spell it out in writing. 87
When appointed to succeed Ruckelshaus as EPA Administrator during
the summer of 1973, Russell Train also insisted upon written assurances
that he retained ultimate policy authority. 88 At his confirmation hearing,
Train emphasized that it was “of crucial importance that EPA establish and
maintain at all times a strongly independent role.” 89 He asserted that while
he would welcome comments from within the government, he alone would
make all final EPA regulatory decisions. 90 Train announced that he had
“already discussed this matter with responsible officials in OMB” and that
he had “full concurrence[] that all processes of interagency comment,
review, and suggestion with respect to proposed regulatory decisions by the
Administrator of EPA will be directed by the Administrator of EPA and be
conducted by him and on his behalf, not controlled by the Office of
Management and Budget.” 91
Train carried out this promise, as illustrated by his reaction to the fierce
lobbying he was subjected to when EPA issued the first regulations limiting
the amount of lead that could be placed in leaded gasoline.92 Despite strong
opposition from presidential aides and OMB and Interior officials, Train
ultimately established the lead limits he initially wanted, while extending
the final deadline for lead phasedown by one year.93
While this demonstrates that it was understood from the first days of
EPA that neither the President nor OMB had directive authority over the
agency, Calabresi and Yoo place a rather different spin on this history.
They assert that the inability of Ruckelshaus or Train to obtain written
assurances of their independence demonstrates that administrative control
was centralized in OMB. Calabresi and Yoo criticize my conclusion that
this history is evidence of agency independence and maintain that it is
“consistent with the unitary executive” because “resignation or removal is
the natural outcome under our theory when an executive official finds
himself or herself out of step with administration policy.” 94 Yet this history
demonstrates that both Administrators Ruckelshaus and Train successfully
86. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 137.
87. QUARLES, supra note 81, at 117–19.
88. Id. at 119.
89. Nomination of Russell E. Train: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Works, 93rd
Cong. 3 (1973) (“I assure you that I, as Administrator, will make the final decisions. I will
seek and welcome comments and suggestions both from within Government and from the
public, but the final decisions will be mine.” (statement of Russell E. Train)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 8 (statement of Russell E. Train).
92. See QUARLES, supra note 81, at 117–42.
93. Id. at 138.
94. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 348.
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resisted White House efforts to influence EPA policy, something that could
not occur if the President actually possessed directive authority. 95
B. Regulatory Review During the Ford and Carter Administrations
Both the Ford and Carter Administrations shifted the focus of
presidential oversight away from prepublication review of agency actions in
favor of review during the public comment period mandated by the APA.96
President Ford’s Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS), part of the
Executive Office of the President, submitted written statements on the
inflationary impact of proposed rules to the agency rulemaking record
during the public comment period.97 The White House did not assert that it
possessed directive authority. Instead it sought to influence agency
decisions by having CWPS participate in rulemaking proceedings with
CWPS officials often testifying at agency hearings. 98 Congress expressly
endorsed this practice when it amended CWPS’s enabling act in 1975.99
The Ford Administration’s continuation of QOL review was more
controversial than its new inflation impact analysis requirement.
Reviewing OMB’s management of the QOL review program, the
Environment Reporter concluded in 1976: “The Office of Management and
Budget plays an influential part in shaping federal environmental policies,
frequently with little public awareness or understanding of its role.” 100
Repeating some of the same criticisms made during the Nixon
Administration, the report noted that EPA officials believed that their
Agency had been unfairly “singled out” for QOL reviews and that other
federal agencies sought to use the review process to weaken EPA
regulations. 101

95. Calabresi and Yoo also maintain that President Nixon’s resignation showed that an
independent counsel law is not needed. Id. at 355. Yet Nixon’s downfall was the direct
result of a special prosecutor who effectively could not be fired by the President seeking and
obtaining White House tapes that proved the President’s culpability in Watergate. Had
Justice Scalia’s position in Morrison v. Olson prevailed, the only effective check on
presidential wrongdoing would be at the ballot box, which was no check at all on a President
who had begun his second and last term.
96. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006); see George C. Eads, White House Oversight of Executive
Branch Regulation, in SOCIAL REGULATION: STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 177, 192–93 (Eugene
Bardach & Robert A. Kagan eds., 1982).
97. See Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 93-387, 88 Stat. 750
(1974).
98. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 139–40.
99. Congress confirmed CWPS’s authority to “intervene and otherwise participate on its
own behalf in rulemaking, ratemaking, licensing and other proceedings before any of the
departments and agencies of the United States, in order to present its views as to the
inflationary impact that might result from the possible outcomes of such proceedings.” Pub.
L. No. 94-78 § 4, 89 Stat. 411, 411 (1974); see NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL
MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING IN REGULATORY AGENCIES 9 (1987); Office of Management
and Budget Plays Critical Part in Environmental Policymaking, Faces Little External
Review, 7 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 693 (1976) [hereinafter Office of Mgmt. & Budget].
100. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 99, at 693.
101. Id.
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President Jimmy Carter surprised some observers by playing a more
active role than President Gerald Ford in efforts to temper agency
regulations. But as in the Ford Administration, the Carter Administration’s
regulatory review program, established by Executive Order 12,044,102 was
expressly structured to respect rulemaking procedures required by the APA
and underlying regulatory statutes. Carter’s Regulatory Analysis Review
Group (RARG), which was responsible for assessing the economic impact
of proposed rules, conducted its reviews on the public record during the
normal course of agency rulemaking proceedings. 103 RARG reviewers
could not attempt to prevent agencies from issuing proposed rules because
RARG review occurred only after proposed rules were published in the
Federal Register. RARG reviews produced public documents summarizing
the reviewers’ concerns, which were submitted to the rulemaking record.104
The RARG program encouraged agencies to take a harder look at
alternatives to proposed regulations, while leaving the ultimate regulatory
decisions to the agency designated by statute to issue the regulation.
In a few cases President Carter was involved in efforts to influence
agency regulatory decisions. The most famous of these occurred on April
30, 1979, when he met with EPA Administrator Douglas Costle and other
officials at the White House to discuss a new source performance standard
(NSPS) for coal-fired power plants that the agency was about to promulgate
pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act. Environmental groups
challenging the NSPS promulgated in June 1979 argued that EPA’s failure
to mention this meeting in the public docket of the rulemaking denied them
due process and violated statutory docketing requirements established by
the Clean Air Act. However, in Sierra Club v. Costle 105 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected these arguments, finding that the
regulations were not based on information arising from the meeting.106
Writing for the majority, Judge Patricia Wald went on in dictum to
recognize not only the constitutional authority of the President to supervise
executive policymaking, citing Myers v. United States, 107 but also the
desirability of such presidential oversight.108
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152, 154 (1979) (issued on March 23, 1978).
See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 144–45.
See id. at 145.
657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 410.
272 U.S. 52 (1926).

The authority of the President to control and supervise executive policymaking
is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is demonstrable
from the practical realities of administrative rulemaking. . . . Our form of
government simply could not function effectively or rationally if key executive
policymakers were isolated from each other and from the Chief Executive. Single
mission agencies do not always have the answers to complex regulatory problems.
An overworked administrator exposed on a 24-hour basis to a dedicated but
zealous staff needs to know the arguments and ideas of policymakers in other
agencies as well as in the White House.
Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 406 (internal citations omitted). Surprisingly, Calabresi and Yoo do
not discuss Sierra Club v. Costle in their discussion of President Carter’s Administration,
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A close reading of Judge Wald’s opinion indicates that it recognizes
limits on the President’s supervisory authority over agency heads. Her
discussion of the relationship between the President and the EPA
Administrator appears to assume that the Administrator retains ultimate
responsibility for the regulatory decision. Judge Wald notes that the
Administrator “needs to know the arguments” of White House staff, not
that she must ultimately adopt them. 109 She recognizes that the President
may be successful in “prodding” the Administrator into adopting a different
regulation, 110 but she does not imply that the President has the authority to
dictate the result.
At the close of the Carter Administration in 1980, Congress enacted the
Paperwork Reduction Act, 111 which provided OMB with its first statutory
basis for regulatory review. The Paperwork Reduction Act requires
agencies to obtain clearance for all requests to collect information from the
public and it created OIRA in OMB, which is now responsible for
conducting regulatory reviews. 112 However, the Paperwork Reduction Act
does not provide any basis for inferring directive authority granted by
Congress. The Act expressly provides that it shall not increase the authority
of the President or OMB with respect to agency substantive policy. 113
C. Regulatory Review during the Reagan Administration
Less than a month after taking office, President Ronald Reagan launched
his Administration’s regulatory review program by issuing Executive Order
12,291. 114 The Reagan regulatory review program was a significant
departure from its predecessors in several important respects. First, it
centralized unprecedented power in OIRA. Unlike previous programs that
only required review of selected regulations, the Reagan program required
that all proposed and final regulations be submitted to OMB for

even though Judge Wald’s dictum probably comes closest of any judicial opinion to support
their argument for presidential directive authority.
109. Id.
110.
Of course, it is always possible that undisclosed presidential prodding may
direct an outcome that is factually based on the record, but different from the
outcome that would have obtained in the absence of presidential involvement. In
such a case, it would be true that the political process did affect the outcome in a
way the courts could not police. But we do not believe that Congress intended that
the courts convert informal rulemaking into a rarified technocratic process,
unaffected by political considerations or the presence of presidential power.
Id. at 408.
111. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3501–3521 (2006)).
112. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3503, 3507.
113. Id. § 3518(e) (2006) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall be interpreted as increasing
or decreasing the authority of the President, the Office of Management and Budget or the
Director thereof, under the laws of the United States, with respect to the substantive policies
and programs of departments, agencies and offices . . . .”).
114. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (issued on February 17, 1981).
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prepublication review. 115 Even more significantly, the Reagan program
purported to give OMB the authority to block publication of regulations for
an indefinite period while review was pending. Unlike RARG reviews that
were conducted during the course of public rulemaking proceedings, the
Reagan executive order directed agencies to “refrain from publishing” any
rule until OMB had completed its review.116
The Reagan regulatory review program also specified substantive criteria
for agencies to use in setting regulatory standards. Executive Order 12,291
directed agencies not simply to analyze the costs of regulation but to base
regulatory decisions on the results of cost-benefit analysis. 117 The executive
order specified not only that least-cost regulatory alternatives be selected
but also that agencies should not regulate unless cost-benefit analysis
demonstrated that the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs. 118 The
Reagan Administration later supplemented Executive Order 12,291 with
Executive Order 12,498 on January 4, 1985.119 This order required
agencies to submit annually to OMB for review a list of all significant
regulatory actions they planned to take during the next year. 120
Despite the boldness of its shift to a centralized system of regulatory
review for virtually all agency actions, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498
included some legal qualifications that are highly significant for the debate
over directive authority. Both executive orders provided that OMB is
authorized to take action only “to the extent permitted by law.”121
Executive Order 12,291 also specified that nothing in the order “shall be
construed as displacing the agencies’ responsibilities delegated by law.”122
In its opinion supporting the legality of Executive Order 12,291, the U.S.
Department of Justice emphasized that “the President’s exercise of
supervisory powers must conform to legislation enacted by Congress.” 123
Therefore, “the President may not, as a general proposition, require or
permit agencies to transgress boundaries set by Congress.” 124 To prevent
the President from usurping authority delegated to EPA, the executive
115. Section 8(b) of Executive Order 12,291 did authorize the OMB to exempt certain
types of regulations from review. Section 8(a) purported to exempt from the prepublication
review requirement regulations that respond to emergency situations and regulations for
which review would conflict with statutory or judicial deadlines. OMB generally ignored
Section 8(a) until they were successfully sued in Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,
627 F. Supp. 566, 567 (D.D.C. 1986), for illegally blocking promulgation of a regulation
subject to an expired statutory deadline.
116. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 129–30.
117. See id. § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. at 129.
118. Id. § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. at 128.
119. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986).
120. See id. §§ 1–2, 3 C.F.R. at 323–24.
121. Exec. Order No. 12,498, § 4, 3 C.F.R. at 325; Exec. Order No. 12,291, §§ 2, 3(a),
6(a), 7(e), 3 C.F.R. at 127–28, 131–32.
122. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(f)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 130.
123. Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Proposed
Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation” (Feb. 13, 1981), reprinted in Role of OMB in
Regulation: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigation of H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong. 486, 488 (1981).
124. Id.
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orders are founded on the theory that OMB’s role is an “advisory and
consultative” one that does not include authority to reject an agency’s
ultimate judgment on matters delegated to it by law.125 Thus, it is clear that
President Reagan deliberately chose not to assert directive authority over
agency decision making. 126
Several studies of the Reagan regulatory review program have noted that,
despite eschewing directive authority, OMB tried mightily to dictate the
substance of agency decision making. 127 OMB’s strategy was to use its
power under Executive Order 12,291 to invoke the “extended review”
provisions contained in section 3(f). If OMB notified an agency that it was
extending its review beyond the normal ten- or sixty-day review period,
Executive Order 12,291 directed the agency to “refrain from publishing”
the rule until OMB’s review was concluded.128 This provision enabled
OMB to block regulations it disfavored for an indefinite period of time.
Although OMB officials initially denied that they used delay as a tool to
influence the substance of rules, they announced in 1989 that they would
pursue a “new direction” that would not use delay to block rules. 129
OMB’s conversion may have been a response to an important judicial
decision confirming the illegality of using regulatory review to delay rules
subject to statutory deadlines. In Environmental Defense Fund v.

125. Id. at 492.
126. After conceding that “Reagan specifically disclaimed any intent to direct agency
decisionmaking,” Calabresi and Yoo cite my prior scholarship on regulatory review to
support this statement: “Even opponents of the unitary executive theory recognized that the
[Reagan] regulatory review program did in fact have a direct impact on regulatory outcomes
and represented one of the most sweeping invocations of the unitary executive yet seen.”
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 381.
127. See Olson, supra note 68 (dicussing OMB’s substantive impact on rulemaking,
focusing on EPA regulations); Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 161–68.
EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford, initially an enthusiastic promoter of the
program, later testified that while Presidential oversight of rulemaking is appropriate, “there
were some serious abuses” by OMB. EPA: Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses
(Part 3): Hearings Before Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 234 (1983) (testimony of Anne Gorsuch Burford). Claims
of abuses by OMB in conducting regulatory reviews were explored in detail in a series of
oversight hearings by congressional committees. See, e.g., OMB Review of EPA Regulations:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 99th Cong. (1986); Oversight of the Office of Management and Budget
Regulatory Review and Planning Process:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intergovernmental Relations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong. (1986);
EPA: Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses, supra; EPA’s Asbestos Regulations:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 99th Cong. (1985); Office of Management and Budget Control of OSHA
Rulemaking: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Government Operations,
97th Cong. (1982); Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
& Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong. (1981).
128. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. 127, 129–30 (1982).
129. OMB Director Richard Darman reportedly instructed OMB staff that, rather than
delaying rules indefinitely, they were to meet with agency staff and “‘try to hash it out’” in
cases where “‘genuine disagreement exists.’” OMB Official Promises End to Rule Delays,
But RCRA Rule Still at Agency After Seven Months, 20 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 8 (1989) (quoting
Robert Grady, Assoc. Director, OMB).
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Thomas 130 a federal district court held that Reagan’s OMB had acted
illegally in blocking EPA from issuing a regulation that was subject to a
statutory deadline that had expired. The court flatly declared: “OMB has
no authority to use its regulatory review under EO 12291 to delay
promulgation of EPA regulations . . . beyond the date of a statutory
deadline.” 131 The court reasoned that although a “certain degree of
deference must be given to the authority of the President to control and
supervise executive policymaking,” action to block promulgation of
regulations required by statute “is incompatible with the will of Congress
and cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the President’s Article II
powers.” 132
The court implicitly rejected the notion that OMB had directive authority
over EPA, noting that “the use of EO 12291 to create delays and to impose
substantive changes raises some constitutional concerns.” 133 As the court
explained:
Congress enacts environmental legislation after years of study and
deliberation, and then delegates to the expert judgment of the EPA
Administrator the authority to issue regulations carrying out the aims of
the law. Under EO 12291, if used improperly, OMB could withhold
approval until the acceptance of certain content in the promulgation of
any new EPA regulation, thereby encroaching upon the independence and
expertise of EPA. Further, unsuccessful executive lobbying on Capitol
Hill can still be pursued administratively by delaying the enactment of
regulations beyond the date of a statutory deadline. 134

D. Regulatory Review During the George H.W. Bush Administration
After pledging during the 1988 presidential campaign to be “the
environmental President,” President George H.W. Bush won an important
victory when he shepherded comprehensive amendments to the Clean Air
Act through Congress, which were approved by overwhelming, bipartisan
majorities in both houses in 1990. 135 But later in his term, with the
economy weakening and another election approaching, President Bush did

130. 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986).
131. Id. at 571. In the interests of full disclosure, the author was lead counsel for the
Environmental Defense Fund in this litigation.
132. Id. at 570.
133. Id.
134. Id. Remarkably, Calabresi and Yoo cite this decision for the proposition that,
although President “Reagan did not invoke any particular statutory authority for issuing
these orders, . . . [c]ourts reviewing these orders apparently agreed” with the President’s
assertion of authority. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 381. In a footnote they cite the
court’s statement that “[a] certain degree of deference must be given to the authority of the
President to control and supervise executive policymaking,” without mentioning that the
Court ruled that OMB had acted illegally by seeking to prevent EPA from performing its
statutory duty. Id. at 501 n.51.
135. An Act to Amend the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990)
(codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.); see Steven J. Shimberg, Stratospheric
Ozone and Climate Protection: Domestic Legislation and the International Process, 21
ENVTL. L. 2175, 2180–81 (1991) (discussing the congressional votes).
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an about face and blamed excessive regulation for the soft economy. 136 He
imposed and extended a regulatory moratorium that delayed
implementation of his signature environmental achievement—the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments. 137
Bush had agreed to continue the regulatory review program established
during the Reagan Administration. 138 When the Paperwork Reduction Act
came up for reauthorization in 1989, congressional critics of OMB sought
to enact requirements to ensure greater public disclosure of OMB’s
regulatory review activities. 139 While OMB agreed to implement the
disclosure procedures voluntarily, the Bush Administration ultimately
refused to approve the deal. 140 In retaliation, Congress refused to confirm a
new administrator for OIRA. 141 While OIRA continued to conduct
regulatory reviews, its activities were overshadowed by a new interagency
task force known as the Council on Competitiveness, created in 1989 and
chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle. 142 The Council was designed to
serve as the successor to the Reagan Administration’s Task Force on
Regulatory Relief, which Bush had chaired at the beginning of the Reagan
Administration before it had been disbanded in 1983. 143 Bush authorized
the Council to intervene in disputes between OMB and agencies that arose
in the course of regulatory reviews. 144
The membership of the Council on Competitiveness was heavily tilted
toward agencies unlikely to be sympathetic to regulation, including the
director of OMB, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Treasury, the
chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, the White
House Chief of Staff, and the Attorney General. 145 The Council described
its mission entirely as reducing regulatory burdens, rather than improving
the net benefits of regulation. 146
In its first major regulatory intervention, the Council disapproved an EPA
NSPS for municipal incinerators that banned incineration of lead acid
136. See Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Moment: What a Historical
Juxtaposition of the Legal Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism Has To Teach
Environmentalists Today, 31 ENVTL. L. 229, 337 (2001).
137. See id.
138. See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 993.
139. See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances:
The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 167–68 (1995).
140. See id. at 168.
141. See id.
142. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 155.
143. When he announced the creation of the Council on Competitiveness on February 9,
1989, President George H.W. Bush confirmed that “[i]n reviewing regulatory matters, the
Council will be continuing the work of the former President’s Task Force on Regulatory
Relief . . . .” EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, APRIL 1, 1990–MARCH 31, 1991, at 5 (1990).
144. See id.
145. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 155.
146. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 143, at 5 (“The Council will
work closely with OIRA to augment the regulatory review process, ensure that the benefits
of regulation outweigh their costs, and coordinate development of legislative and
administrative initiatives to reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens.”).
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batteries and required recycling of twenty-five percent of waste streams.147
Ironically, the recycling requirement had been touted by the Bush
Administration a year before “as a remedy to the nation’s burgeoning solid
waste problem.” 148 The Council issued a triumphant press release declaring
that it had slayed a regulatory dragon, forgetting the fiction that agencies
were supposed to retain the ultimate decisionmaking authority. 149
Although EPA complied with the Council’s “decision,” when the NSPS
was challenged in court, the deletion of the ban on lead acid batteries was
struck down as not adequately justified. 150
There was no consistent pattern concerning the stage of the regulatory
process at which Competitiveness Council review occurred. While the
Council reviewed incinerator NSPS on the eve of final promulgation, it also
attempted to dictate changes to a wetlands delineation manual during
extensive pre-proposal review. 151 In a March 22, 1991 Memorandum to the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Vice President Quayle
asserted that the Council had jurisdiction over an extraordinarily broad
range of agency activities including even agency issuances of press
releases. 152 Most agencies apparently ignored this directive. 153
In 1992 the George H.W. Bush Administration also was involved in a
controversy over efforts to exempt the Bureau of Land Management from
compliance with the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for sales of timber
from public lands. Using a special procedure provided in the Act, 154 the
Administration convened an Endangered Species Committee, popularly
know as the “God squad,” that held a hearing to determine whether an
exemption should be granted. Pursuant to the statute, the Committee
consisted of six administration officials and one representative of the
affected states. 155 On May 15, 1992, the Committee voted 5–2 to approve
147. See Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 155.
148. Michael Weisskopf, EPA Proposal on Recycling Is Trashed, WASH. POST, Dec. 20,
1990, at A17.
149. See President’s Council on Competitiveness Fact Sheet (Dec. 19, 1990), reprinted in
Clean Air Act Implementation (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health & the
Environment of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 102d Cong. 164–65 (1991).
150. New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
151. See E. Donald Elliot, Portage Strategies for Adapting Environmental Law and
Policy During a Logjam Era, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 24, 42 n.43 (2008).
152. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1442 n.271 (1992).
153. See id. (“If the executive agencies had taken this directive seriously, OMB would
have soon become inundated with submissions of such informal policymaking devices.”).
154. Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires federal agencies to
ensure that their actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). However, section 7(h) of the ESA
allows a specially-convened interagency committee known as the “God squad” to grant an
exemption if it determines, following a formal adjudicatory hearing, that “there are no
reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action” and that the action meets three
other requirements. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i).
155. The seven-member Committee was comprised of: the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of the Interior, the
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and “one individual
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the exemption. 156 When this decision was challenged in court, it was
revealed that White House officials had put substantial pressure on the
Committee members to vote for the exemption, including summoning three
members to the White House. 157
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that it was illegal
for the White House to have ex parte contacts with the members of the
“God squad” while they were considering the exemption because the
hearing they were conducting was a formal adjudication.158 The APA
prohibits ex parte contacts by any “interested person outside the agency”
with those involved in the decisional processes of formal adjudications.159
Noting that “the Committee is, in effect, an administrative court,” the Ninth
Circuit stated that “[e]x parte contacts are antithetical to the very concept of
an administrative court reaching impartial decisions through formal
adjudication.” 160 The court rejected the Administration’s arguments that
neither the President nor any of the members of his staff could be
considered an “interested person outside the agency.” 161 The court
observed that:
As the head of government and chief executive officer, the President
necessarily has an interest in every agency proceeding. No ex parte
communication is more likely to influence an agency than one from the
President or a member of his staff. No communication from any other
person is more likely to deprive the parties and the public of their right to
effective participation in a key governmental decision at a most crucial
time. 162

Responding to the Administration’s argument that the President, as the
head of the executive branch, cannot be deemed to be “outside the agency,”
the court noted:
The Supreme Court soundly rejected the basic logic of this argument in
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy. The Court held that where
legally binding regulations delegated a particular discretionary decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Attorney General could not dictate
a decision of the Board, even though the Board was appointed by the
Attorney General, its members served at his pleasure, and its decision was
subject to his ultimate review. Here, the Endangered Species Act
explicitly vests discretion to make exemption decisions in the Committee
and does not contemplate that the President or the White House will
from each affected State” appointed by the President, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3), with the state
representatives having one collective vote. Committee Meetings, 50 C.F.R. § 453.05(d)
(1991).
156. See Scott A. Powell, Comment, Global Protection of Threatened and Endangered
Species: Rethinking Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 523,
529 n.29 (1995).
157. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1538 (9th
Cir. 1993).
158. See id. at 1543.
159. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(A) (2006).
160. Portland Audubon, 984 F.2d at 1543.
161. See id. at 1546.
162. Id. at 1545 (emphasis omitted).
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become involved in Committee deliberations. The President and his aides
are not a part of the Committee decision-making process. They are
“outside the agency” for the purposes of the ex parte communications
ban. 163

The court noted that the ESA does contain one mixed agency-President
delegation giving the President ultimate decisionmaking authority on
exemption applications relating to restoration of a public facility in a
disaster area, 164 but it noted that the Act did not provide for the President’s
involvement in the God squad’s deliberative process.165
Finally, the court rejected the Administration’s claim that it would be a
violation of constitutional principles of separation of powers for the APA to
bar the President from pressuring committee members. The court observed:
While the government’s argument to the contrary arises in the context
of Committee decisions regarding Endangered Species Act exemption
applications, carried to its logical conclusion the government’s position
would effectively destroy the integrity of all federal agency adjudications.
It is a fundamental precept of administrative law that . . . when an agency
performs a quasi-judicial (or a quasi-legislative) function its independence
must be protected. There is no presidential prerogative to influence quasijudicial administrative agency proceedings through behind-the-scenes
lobbying. Myers itself clearly recognizes that “there may be duties of a
quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and members of
executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of
individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in a particular
case properly influence or control.” And in Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States the Court observed that “[t]he authority of Congress, in
creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act
in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot well
be doubted.” The government’s position in this case is antithetical to and
destructive of these elementary legal precepts, and we unequivocally
reject it. 166

One of the most celebrated regulatory disputes during the George H.W.
Bush Administration involved a conflict between the FDA and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) that reached a dénouement shortly
before President Bill Clinton assumed office. FDA was charged with
issuing regulations to implement the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
of 1990.167 When the USDA objected that FDA’s preferred regulations
were likely to reduce meat consumption by making it easier for consumers
to learn the fat content of food products, OMB sided with USDA. 168 FDA
refused to back down, believing that the statute’s purpose was to make it
163. Id. (internal citations omitted).
164. On mixed agency-President delegations see the text accompanying note 56.
165. Portland Audubon, 984 F.2d at 1545 n.24.
166. Id. at 1546–47 (internal citations omitted).
167. Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
168. See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY 57–58 (2001).
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easier for consumers to understand nutrition data, rather than to protect the
economic interest of the politically powerful livestock industry. 169
As then-FDA Commissioner David Kessler notes, OMB repeatedly
refused to approve FDA’s draft final rule, which it kept returning to the
FDA with amendments that “had been taken almost verbatim from industry
comments we already had carefully considered.”170 Kessler felt so strongly
about the issue that he had decided to resign in protest if ordered to adopt
the regulations in the form favored by OMB and USDA. 171 Both agencies
refused to budge, and USDA enlisted the Council on Competitiveness to
side with its position, which was elevated to the White House for
decision. 172 Kessler writes that “[m]y fate as commissioner and the fate of
nutrition labeling had become inextricably linked. If the decision went
against us, I could not disobey an order from the President. For me as a
political appointee, the only response to defeat was to leave.” 173
At a White House meeting to resolve the controversy, President Bush
expressed surprise at the notion that “I’m being told that I can’t just make a
decision and have it promptly executed, that the Department can’t just
salute smartly and go execute whatever decision I make. Why is that?”174
The reason was that there was no support in the rulemaking record for the
USDA’s preferred option, and it would have taken a long time to try to
manufacture a record that would support it.175 Louis Sullivan, the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, ultimately
persuaded the President by showing him a McDonald’s tray liner with
nutrition information that was more in line with what FDA wanted.176
President Bush ultimately ruled in favor of FDA with one minor
modification concerning restaurants, which the agency implemented. 177
In their book on the unitary executive, Calabresi and Yoo argue that in
my previous scholarship I erroneously characterized Bush’s “I can’t just
make a decision and have it promptly executed” quotation “as a reflection
of limitations on the President’s sole authority to execute the law.” 178 They
argue that:
Bush’s inability to impose OMB’s proposal did not reflect any substantive
restrictions on the President’s authority to execute the law. Changes of
the magnitude proposed by OMB would have to be subjected to the notice
and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
would delay the decision by at least six to eight weeks and leave the final
decision to the Clinton administration. 179

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id. at 58–59.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
See Marian Burros, Eating Well, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1992, at C4.
KESSLER, supra note 168, at 67.
Id. at 68.
See id. at 68–69.
See id. at 69.
See id. at 70–71.
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 388.
Id. at 388–89.
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Calabresi and Yoo are correct in their reading of Kessler’s memoirs, but
their apparent agreement that the APA can trump the directive authority that
they champion for the President is telling. The APA requires that
regulatory decisions not be arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law, and
the underlying regulatory statute here required that the decision be made by
the FDA Commissioner and not the President. Moreover, both the agency
and the President are constrained to make a decision that has sufficient
support in the rulemaking record, which, as Kessler notes, meant only his
preferred outcome and not that favored by OMB and USDA because the
economic interests of the beef industry was not a statutorily relevant factor.
Thus, in the short run, it made little difference who the President sided with
in this case because only one of the two proposed outcomes would likely be
upheld in court. The fact that Kessler was willing to resign rather than
accede to a regulatory outcome that would be inconsistent with the law does
not support the notion that the President has directive authority. Rather it
powerfully suggests that Kessler had the integrity not to want to continue to
work for an administration if it tried to force him to violate the law.
E. Regulatory Review During the Clinton Administration
President Clinton established the regulatory review program that remains
in effect today when he issued Executive Order 12,866 on September 30,
1993. 180 The most significant feature of the Clinton program is that it made
regulatory review far more selective than it had been under Presidents
Reagan and Bush. Under Executive Order 12,866 only “significant
regulatory actions” (those estimated to cost more than $100 million per
year) are subject to review by OMB. 181 Clinton’s program also sought to
prevent OMB from indefinitely delaying agency action by establishing a
firm ninety-day deadline for completion of OMB review. 182 It also
specified that the Vice President should resolve disputes between agencies
and OMB. 183
Because of its greater selectivity and transparency, Clinton’s regulatory
review program was far less controversial than those employed by the two
preceding administrations. 184 But President Clinton did not shy away from
involvement in regulatory decisions. He greatly expanded the issuance of
formal presidential directives to executive agencies. In his two full terms in
office, President Reagan issued only nine directives to agencies, and
President George H.W. Bush issued only four during his term—three of
these instructed agencies to delay or halt the issuance of regulations.185 In
his eight years in office President Clinton issued 107 presidential directives,
including many directing agencies to take action to address particular

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
Id. § 6(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 645.
See id. § 6(b)(2)(B), 3 C.F.R. at 647.
Id. § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 648.
See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 995.
Kagan, supra note 7, at 2294.
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problems. 186 Only fifteen of these directives were issued in Clinton’s first
three years in office, but he then averaged more than eighteen directives in
each of his last five years.187 Rather than focusing exclusively on reducing
costs to industry, President Clinton frequently directed agencies to take
actions to strengthen protection of public health, safety, and the
environment. Justice Kagan, who was then a professor, described Clinton’s
actions as a new model of “presidential administration” that she predicted
would be embraced by future Presidents. 188
Although regulatory review is far more selective under Executive Order
12,866 than under its predecessors, Kagan notes that Clinton’s executive
order, “unlike the Reagan orders, suggested that the President had authority
to direct executive department (though not independent agency) heads in
the exercise of their delegated rulemaking power.” 189 This authority is
contained in section 7 of the executive order, which provides that:
[t]o the extent permitted by law, disagreements or conflicts between or
among agency heads or between OMB and any agency that cannot be
resolved by the Administrator of OIRA shall be resolved by the President,
or by the Vice President acting at the request of the President, with the
relevant agency head (and, as appropriate, other interested governmental
officials). 190

The order provides that, after considering recommendations developed
within sixty days by the Vice President, this “conflict resolution” process is
to culminate in notification to the agency and OMB “of the President’s
decision with respect to the matter.” 191 This tracks the process used by the
George H.W. Bush Administration to resolve the dispute between FDA and
USDA over the nutrition labeling regulations. Executive Order 12,866 adds
new requirements for disclosure of any outside lobbying during this conflict
resolution process. Communications during the review period with any
person not employed by the federal government must be in writing and
included in the public rulemaking docket. 192
However, like the regulatory review executive orders issued by previous
administrations, Executive Order 12,866 expressly disclaims directive
authority when Congress has made agency heads responsible for regulatory
decisions. In fact, this disclaimer occupies an even more prominent part of
Executive Order 12,866 where it appears as an entire section—section 9—
instead of being buried in one of nine subsections of section 3, as it was in
Executive Order 12,291. Section 9 of Executive Order 12,866 provides:
“Nothing in this order shall be construed as displacing the agencies’
186. Id. at 2294–95.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2317.
189. Id. at 2288. Executive Order 12,866 purported to subject independent agencies to
OMB’s regulatory planning process for the first time, though like its predecessors it did not
require independent agencies to submit individual rules to OMB for review. Exec. Order No.
12,866, § 4(c), 3 C.F.R. 638, 642 (1994).
190. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 648.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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authority or responsibilities, as authorized by law.” 193 Thus, all of the
executive orders establishing presidential regulatory review programs
expressly disclaim directive authority.
Kagan does not argue that the Constitution grants directive authority to
the President. She notes that “unlike the unitarians, I acknowledge that
Congress generally may grant discretion to agency officials alone and that
when Congress has done so, the President must respect the limits of this
delegation.” 194 But she argues that regulatory statutes should be interpreted
as intending to confer such authority on the President: “[W]hen Congress
designates an agency official as a decisionmaker, the President himself may
step into that official’s shoes.” 195 However, a fundamental problem with
her argument is that the presumption was precisely the opposite when those
statutes were enacted, which is reflected in the fact that the Reagan, Bush,
and Clinton executive orders expressly eschewed assertions of such
authority. 196
F. Regulatory Review During the George W. Bush Administration
President George W. Bush surprised some observers early in his second
term in office when he signed Executive Order 13,258, which continued the
regulatory review program adopted by President Clinton’s Executive Order
12,866 with only one change. The surprise stemmed from the fact that the
Clinton Administration’s review program was far more selective than its
predecessors, even though President George W. Bush was far more
skeptical of regulation than the Clinton Administration had been. The one
change was that Bush transferred the Vice President’s authority to resolve
disputes between OMB and the agencies to the White House Chief of Staff
or the Director of OMB. 197 In his book Angler: The Cheney Vice
Presidency, Barton Gellman reports another surprise—the reason for this
change. He notes that “Cheney arrived in office to find a gold mine of
authority over environmental and other rules,” including the fact that
Executive Order 12,866 gave the Vice President a role in resolving interagency disputes, adopted by Clinton to enhance Gore’s role in regulatory
policy. 198 Gellman reports that the deletion of the Vice President’s role in
the executive order was made at Cheney’s request because Cheney wanted
“the power, but not the public profile.” 199 Cheney wanted to direct
regulatory policy behind the scenes. “Rather than directing the process
openly, Cheney interceded through allies at the Office of Management and
Budget” and “through eager-to-please staffs at Interior, Commerce, Energy,
and their subagencies” where he had carefully placed his loyalists.200
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. § 9, 3 CFR at 649.
Kagan, supra note 7, at 2320.
Id. at 2322.
See text accompanying note 121–26, 174–75 supra.
Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003).
BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 198 (2008).
Id. at 199.
Id.
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Although Cheney had installed his former employee Christine Todd
Whitman as EPA Administrator, Gellman reports that he ultimately
precipitated her resignation as a result of two stunning policy shifts that
undermined her authority. First, in March 2001 Cheney persuaded
President Bush to reverse his campaign pledge to control emissions of
carbon dioxide to combat climate change. Gellman reports that Cheney
engineered this stunning policy reversal by carefully excluding EPA and the
State Department from having any input into the decision and ensuring that
Bush would sign the confirming document minutes before Whitman and the
Secretary of State arrived at the White House to protest. 201
Gellman reports that the issue that ultimately prompted Whitman’s
resignation was Cheney’s efforts to force EPA to gut the rules governing
new source review of powerplants. The existing rules had been the subject
of a successful ongoing enforcement campaign started during the final years
of the Clinton Administration that had upset the utility industry.202
Gellman quotes Whitman as saying, “I just couldn’t sign” the rule. 203 “The
President has a right to have an administrator who could defend it, and I just
couldn’t.” 204 The rule subsequently was struck down by the D.C.
Circuit. 205
Gellman also reports that Cheney personally spearheaded a successful
effort to stop the Interior Department from protecting three species of fish
by reducing the amount of Klamath River water supplied to private
farmers. 206 “In late September 2002, the first of an estimated seventy-seven
thousand dead salmon began washing up on the banks of the Klamath
River,” a “kill [that] would not have happened without the diversion of
water to farms.” 207
President Bush’s nomination of Harvard professor John Graham to be
administrator of OIRA was vigorously opposed by environmental and
consumer groups who argued that he was too sympathetic to corporate
On July 19, 2001, the Senate confirmed Graham’s
interests. 208
appointment by a vote of 61–37.209 In an effort to demonstrate that he
planned to be even-handed in conducting regulatory review, Graham
announced that OIRA would issue “prompt” letters to agencies to direct
their attention to issues that deserve greater regulatory attention.210 In

201. Id. at 82–85, 88–90.
202. Id. at 205.
203. Id. at 208.
204. Id.
205. New York v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 443 F.3d 880, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
206. GELLMAN, supra note 198, at 195–213.
207. Id. at 213.
208. See, e.g., Dick Durbin, Op-Ed., Graham Flunks the Cost-Benefit Test, WASH. POST,
July 16, 2001, at A15.
209. 147 CONG. REC. 13,943–44 (2001).
210. See John D. Graham, Memorandum for the President’s Management Council,
Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking by OIRA, Sept. 20, 2001, at 5, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_OIRA_review_process (describing the meaning of
“prompt” letters); see also John D. Graham, Paul R. Noe & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing
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September 2001, OIRA sent prompt letters to the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) and to the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS). The letter to OSHA encouraged the agency to
require companies to use automated external defibrillators to prevent deaths
from heart attacks. 211 The letter to HHS encouraged it to require food
labeling that would disclose trans-fatty acid content.212
During the latter part of his second term in office, President George W.
Bush extended the scope of OMB review. On January 18, 2007, Bush
issued Executive Order 13,422, which amended Executive Order 12,866.213
The new executive order required that each agency’s “regulatory policy
officer” (RPO), required by Executive Order 12,866, be a presidential
appointee, and it mandated that OMB review agencies’ “significant
guidance documents” for the first time. 214 The RPOs no longer were to
report to the head of the agency, but their approval was required before any
agency rulemaking could be commenced. 215 The executive order also
required agencies to identify in writing the specific market failure or
problem that warrants a new regulation and to provide their “best estimates”
of the cumulative regulatory costs and benefits of rules to be issued in the
next year. 216
The George W. Bush Administration was marked by several important
controversies over White House influence over rulemaking. Six of these
controversies are outlined below.
1. The Congressional Review Act and the OSHA Ergonomics Standard
On the day the Bush Administration took office, White House Chief of
Staff Andrew Card, Jr. issued a memorandum to the heads of all executive
department agencies directing them not to send any proposed or final
regulations to the Federal Register without the approval of a Bush appointee
and to withdraw all regulations that had been sent to the Federal Register
which had not yet been published except for rules dealing with emergency
situations. 217
After an initial effort to block the outgoing Clinton Administration’s
tighter regulation of arsenic in drinking water created a public furor, the

the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
953, 972 (2006).
211. Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, OIRA, to John Henshaw, Assistant Sec’y of
Labor (Sept. 18, 2001), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/osha_prompt_letter.html.
212. Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, OIRA, to Tommy G. Thompson, HHS Sec’y
(Sept. 18, 2001), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/hhs_prompt_letter.html; see Ellen
Nakashima, OMB Asks Agencies for Action, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2001, at A30.
213. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008).
214. Id. §§ 5(b), 7, 3 C.F.R. at 193.
215. Id. § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. at 192.
216. CURTIS COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33862, CHANGES TO THE OMB
REGULATORY REVIEW PROCESS BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13422 (2007).
217. Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr. for the Heads and Acting Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 20, 2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001).
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Bush Administration ultimately decided to let the rule take effect.218
However, President Bush did succeed in killing one significant regulation
promulgated by the outgoing administration. In March 2001 President
Bush enthusiastically signed a joint resolution approved by Congress under
the fast-track provisions of the Congressional Review Act (CRA) 219 to veto
OSHA’s ergonomics standard, which had been under development by the
agency for nearly a decade. 220 The CRA requires agencies to send all
regulations to Congress for review sixty days before they take effect, and it
creates a special fast track procedure to enable Congress to enact joint
resolutions disapproving regulations. 221 If Congress enacts a joint
resolution of disapproval, the regulation shall not take effect or continue in
effect, and the agency that issued it is prohibited from issuing any new rule
that is “substantially the same as” the disapproved rule unless specifically
authorized by subsequent legislation.222
Using the fast track procedures of the CRA, the joint resolution
disapproving OSHA’s regulation was adopted without any hearings or
committee action, with no opportunity for amendments, and with floor
debate limited to ten hours. 223 President Bush endorsed the disapproval
effort and signed the joint resolution repealing the rule. 224 Many of those
who voted to repeal the rule stated that they were not opposed to having an
ergonomics standard, but that they objected to the particular standard that
had been adopted by OSHA. 225 Labor Secretary Elaine Chao announced
that the department would consider a new rule to protect workers from
The regulation’s supporters, however,
repetitive-motion injuries. 226
believed that its opponents would use the CRA to preclude OSHA from

218. See GELLMAN, supra note 198, at 207.
219. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006).
220. On March 1, 2001, Congressional Republicans introduced a resolution of
disapproval, which was approved by the Senate on March 6, 2001 by a vote of 56–44. Pub.
L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001); 147 CONG. REC. 2682, 2873–74 (2001). On March 7, the
U.S. House of Representatives adopted the joint resolution by a vote of 223–206. Id. at
3037–38. OSHA had expected that its ergonomics rule would prevent 4.6 million worker
injuries per year from carpal tunnel syndrome, back strains, and other ailments over ten
years. See 65 Fed. Reg. 68,772 (Nov. 14, 2000). OSHA acknowledged that the rule would
be expensive for businesses, estimating that it ultimately could cost $4.5 billion to
implement, but it projected that it would save $9 billion per year by reducing worker
injuries. See id. at 68,773.
221. See 5 U.S.C. § 802(a).
222. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2). In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a legislative veto of regulations is unconstitutional
because it bypassed the President’s role in approving or disapproving of legislation. Id. at
956–59. The Congressional Review Act avoids this constitutional problem by providing that
joint resolutions of disapproval must either be signed by the President or enacted over his
veto.
223. See 147 CONG. REC. 2815 (statement of Sen. Trent Lott).
224. Statement on Signing Legislation To Repeal Federal Ergonomics Regulations, 1
PUB. PAPERS 269 (Mar. 20, 2001).
225. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. 2828 (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson); id. at 2836
(statement of Sen. Christopher Bond).
226. See id. at 2816 (statement of Sen. James Jeffords).
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issuing a new ergonomics rule without new legislation specifically
authorizing it to do so. 227
President Bush’s support for using the CRA to veto OSHA’s ergonomics
standard actually reinforced the notion that the President does not have
directive authority over regulatory decisions by agencies. Otherwise, Bush
simply could have directed OSHA to repeal the standard. If the President
has the authority to dictate agency decisions, then it is hard to envision why
President Clinton would have signed the CRA into law. If the President
exerts complete control over agency rulemaking decisions, he would not
need a special vehicle to expedite repeal of them. Indeed, the circumstances
surrounding the repeal of OSHA’s ergonomics regulation—a new
administration supporting repeal of a rule issued by the outgoing
administration—probably reflects the already high degree of presidential
control over rulemaking. Because the President already has so much
influence over what agencies do, OSHA’s ergonomics regulation is the only
regulation that has ever been repealed using the CRA in the quarter century
of its existence.
2. The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Controversy
On December 19, 2007, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson
unexpectedly denied California’s request for a waiver that would permit the
state to implement its program to regulate GHG emissions from motor
vehicles. 228 California requested the waiver pursuant to the Clean Air Act
(CAA) section 209, which provides that the EPA Administrator shall waive
section 209’s preemption of state law if the Administrator determines that
the state standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public
health as applicable federal standards.229 Section 209 stipulates that no
waiver shall be granted if: (A) the relevant state regulation is arbitrary and
capricious or (B) the state does not need the standards to meet “compelling
and extraordinary conditions.” 230
Johnson’s decision to deny the waiver was a clear break from prior
agency practice, and it defied the EPA career staff’s unanimous
recommendation to grant at least a partial waiver. 231 A subsequent
investigation by the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform revealed that Johnson had supported granting at least a partial

227. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2); 147 CONG. REC. 2836 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein)
(“If what I think will happen happens when . . . the ergonomics standard is overturned,
OSHA is barred from introducing any standard that is substantially similar to the rule unless
specifically authorized by a subsequent act of Congress. This effectively kills a 10-year
effort.”).
228. Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor
of California (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2006).
230. Id. § 7543(b)(1)(A)–(B).
231. See Juliet Eilperin, EPA Chief Denies Calif. Limit on Auto Emissions, WASH. POST,
Dec. 20, 2007, at A1.
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waiver until shortly before his decision to deny it.232 Johnson abruptly
changed course after meeting with White House officials, despite the EPA
career staff’s insistence that the most legally defensible course of action
would be to grant the waiver. 233 The waiver is particularly important
because at least thirteen states had adopted California’s standards234 and
several others had pledged to do so. 235 Collectively these states represent
nearly half of the U.S. market for new vehicles.236
Administrator Johnson stated that he denied the waiver because
California lacked the requisite “compelling and extraordinary conditions” to
warrant a waiver 237 because climate change is a “global problem” that is
not exclusive to California and thus requires a national solution.238 That
“national solution” to which Johnson referred ostensibly was the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, 239 which was signed into law
hours before Johnson denied the waiver. Johnson claimed that by denying
the waiver, the Bush Administration was “moving forward with a clear
national solution, not a confusing patchwork of state rules.” 240
In May of 2008, the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform concluded its investigation that revealed that between June and
December 2007 the EPA staff held several briefings regarding the waiver
request and in each meeting advised Johnson that the clearest option was to
grant the waiver. 241 A final briefing took place in October 2007 and
included a presentation that contained the professional opinions of EPA’s
The EPA staff concluded that the
technical and legal staff. 242
circumstances surrounding the waiver were “compelling and
extraordinary,” and EPA would almost certainly win if it faced a lawsuit for
232. See EPA’s New Ozone Standards: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight &
Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter EPA’s New Ozone Standards]
(statement of Rep. Henry Waxman); id. at 136 (testimony of EPA Administrator Stephen
Johnson).
233. Eilperin, supra note 231.
234. Memorandum from the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform on the
EPA’s
Denial
of
the
California
Waiver
(May
19,
2008),
http://www.cleancarscampaign.org/web-content/cleanairact/docs/Waxman-result-5-1908.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum]. The states that adopted California’s standards were
Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Id.
235. Eilperin, supra note 231.
236. Id.
237. Memorandum, supra note 234.
238. Matthew L. Wald, E.P.A. Chief Defends His Decision on California, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2008, at A19.
239. Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
240. Eilperin, supra note 231. Notably, in the Clean Air Act’s thirty-seven year history,
EPA had never before denied a waiver to California under section 209. Id. Since 1970, the
EPA granted more than fifty waivers involving tailpipe emissions that affected some states
more than others. John M. Broder & Micheline Maynard, Denial of California Bid on
Emissions Should Have Been Foreseen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at A37.
241. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Majority Staff, Memorandum, EPA’s
Denial of the California Waiver (May 19, 2008), at 6–16, in EPA’s New Ozone Standards,
supra note 232, at 11, 16–28 [hereinafter Memorandum].
242. Id. at 23–26.
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granting the waiver and that it could likely lose if it did not.243 The
Committee’s investigation found substantial evidence to suggest that
Administrator Johnson supported the waiver, but changed his mind after
communicating with the White House, despite his staff’s unanimous
conclusion that a denial of the waiver was likely to be overturned in
court. 244 Johnson refused to reveal his discussions with the White House,
but he maintained that denial of the waiver was his own decision. 245
3. EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding
As indicated by the California waiver controversy, EPA Administrator
Steven Johnson was widely considered to be a weak administrator who was
easily manipulated by OMB and the White House. 246 This also is reflected
in controversies over whether or not EPA would make an endangerment
finding for emissions of GHGs and a dispute over EPA’s revisions to
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone.
In April 2007 the Supreme Court ruled that EPA was required to
determine whether GHG emissions endangered public health or welfare
pursuant to the CAA. 247 After reviewing the scientific data and holding
multiple inter- and intra-agency meetings, EPA decided to proceed with its
endangerment report, which it emailed to OMB on December 5, 2007.248
Minutes later the associate administrator who sent the email received a
phone call from the White House instructing the agency to retract the email
and to say that it had been sent in error. 249 Johnson refused and said that he
had approval to issue the draft findings. 250 Johnson also refused to
withdraw the document when later asked to say that it could become moot
as a result of energy legislation moving through Congress. 251 OMB then

243. Memorandum, supra note 241, at 23. An earlier version of the slide contained
“much stronger language” regarding the litigation outcome should EPA deny the waiver. Id.
at 23–24. Multiple witnesses testifying before the House committee investigating EPA’s
denial of the waiver request confirmed that Administrator Johnson was made aware of the
waiver criteria and legal risks that would come with a denial. Id. at 24–26.
244. See id. at 12.
245. EPA’s New Ozone Standards, supra note 232, at 137 (testimony of EPA
Administrator Stephen Johnson).
246. See Bush Leaves Weak Environmental Legacy, Ex-EPA Officials Say, ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
Dec.
8,
2008,
available
at
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/
index.ssf/2008/12/bush_leaves_weak_environmental.html (“‘Here we see a real failure of
leadership,’ said Russell Train, EPA administrator during the Nixon and Ford eras. ‘EPA
has become a nonentity.’”).
247. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532–35 (2007).
248. Juliet Eilperin, White House Tried To Silence EPA Proposal on Car Emissions,
WASH. POST, June 26, 2008, at A2.
249. Id.
250. See Letter from EPA Administrator Stephen L. Johnson to President George W.
Bush (January 31, 2008), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/EnclosureLetter_PresdidentfromStephenJohnson_2.8.2011_2.p
df [hereinafter Letter].
251. See id.
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decided simply never to open the email because it would start the review
process and eventually result in the document becoming public.252
On January 31, 2008, Johnson sent a letter to President Bush stating that
in light of the latest scientific evidence, EPA was required to respond to the
Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA ruling by proposing a positive
endangerment finding for GHG emissions under the CAA. Johnson’s letter,
which was revealed by Congressman Henry Waxman in February 2011,
stated:
[Massachusetts v. EPA] combined with the latest science of climate
change requires the Agency to propose a positive endangerment finding,
as was agreed to at the Cabinet-level meeting in November . . . . [T]he
state of the latest climate change science does not permit a negative
finding, nor does it permit a credible finding that we need to wait for more
research. 253

The letter then refers to a “prudent and cautious yet forward thinking” plan
that will meet EPA’s legal obligations in response to several lawsuits. 254
While noting that “I welcome your guidance as we move forward,” Johnson
stated that “[a]fter careful and sometime[s] difficult deliberation, I have
concluded that it is in the Administration’s best interest to move forward
with this plan in the next few weeks.” 255 In an appendix marked
“Privileged Communication to the President,” Johnson outlined an “EPA
Climate Change Plan” that included issuance of a proposed positive
endangerment finding for public notice and comment in March or April
2008 and finalizing it by the end of 2008. 256 Johnson’s plan reportedly was
blocked by OMB, which required the agency to strip out the endangerment
finding from its proposal. 257 Finally on July 11, 2008, EPA issued an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking, which asked for public comment
on whether or not GHG emissions pose any danger. 258
4. National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Ozone
EPA also ran into OMB interference when it finally reviewed the
NAAQS for ozone. On February 22, 2008, EPA submitted its draft final
252. Felicity Barringer, White House Refused To Open E-Mail on Pollutants, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2008, at A15. Six weeks before this incident, OMB had eviscerated draft testimony
on the effects of climate change on public health that Julie Gerberding, the head of the
Centers for Disease Control, had planned to deliver before a hearing of the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee. Brandon Keim, White House Censors CDC
Official’s Testimony on Climate Change and Health, WIRED (Oct. 24, 2007, 9:18 AM),
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2007/10/white-house-cen/. Due to deletions ordered by
OMB, her written statement shrunk from twelve pages to six pages. Id.
253. Letter, supra note 250.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See generally SELECT COMM. ON ENERGY INDEPENDENCE & GLOBAL WARMING,
110TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO MASSACHUSETTS
V. EPA (July 18, 2008), http://globalwarming.house.gov/tools/2q08materials/files/0110.pdf.
258. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air
Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008).
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regulation to OMB. 259 EPA’s draft would tighten the primary standard to
seventy-five parts per billion (ppb) and adopt a secondary standard of
seventy ppb. 260 Two weeks later OIRA Administrator Susan Dudley
objected to EPA’s decision to adopt different primary and secondary
NAAQS for ozone for the first time. 261 EPA was under a deadline to
finalize the standard by March 12, 2008.262
Administrator Johnson had scheduled a 1:00 p.m. press conference that
day to announce the new standard. 263 Shortly before the press conference,
Dudley informed Johnson that President Bush “has concluded that,
consistent with Administration policy, added protection should be afforded
to public welfare by strengthening the secondary ozone standard and setting
it to be identical to the new primary standard” at seventy-five ppb.264
Johnson then postponed the press conference to 6:00 p.m. when he
announced the standards dictated by OMB. 265 John Walke, an attorney for
the Natural Resources Defense Council, denounced the decision, claiming
that it was “unprecedented and an unlawful act of political interference for
the President personally to override a decision that the Clean Air Act leaves
exclusively to EPA’s expert scientific judgment.” 266
5. The FDA and “Plan B”
For several years the Bush Administration was embroiled in controversy
over whether the FDA should approve Plan B, an emergency contraceptive,
for non-prescription use. FDA was caught between intense pressure from
the White House not to approve the request and pressure from members of
Congress who blocked confirmation of two nominees for FDA
Commissioner until they promised at least to make a decision.267 When
FDA finally acted to deny non-prescription use of the drug for women
under the age of eighteen, its decision was challenged by the Center for
Reproductive Rights in Tummino v. Torti. 268
Plaintiffs who sued FDA were able to explore the unusual
decisionmaking procedure it employed when it decided to continue to
require prescriptions for women under eighteen who wished to use Plan B.
Discovery revealed that in a Commissioner’s meeting concerning the switch

259. EPA’s New Ozone Standards, supra note 232, at 76 (statement of Susan E. Dudley).
260. Melanie Marlowe, The Unitary Executive and Review of Agency Rulemaking, in THE
UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND THE MODERN PRESIDENCY 77, 95 (Ryan J. Barilleaux &
Christopher S. Kelley eds., 2010).
261. See EPA’s New Ozone Standards, supra note 232, at 76 (statement of Susan E.
Dudley).
262. Id. at 77.
263. Marlowe, supra note 260, at 95.
264. Id.
265. See id.
266. Juliet Eilperin, Ozone Rules Weakened at Bush’s Behest, WASH. POST, March 14,
2008, at A1.
267. See generally Nomination of Andrew von Eschenbach and Paul DeCamp: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 109th Cong. (2006).
268. 603 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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application, the discussion among Deputy Commissioner Dr. Lester
Crawford and review staff turned to the “political sensitivity” of the
switch. 269 Moreover, Commissioner Dr. Mark McClellan discussed the
application with Jay Lefkowitz, the Deputy Assistant to the President for
Domestic Policy, and provided updates on the application to White House
staff. 270 According to the testimony of FDA senior staff members, political
and ideological factors also played a determinative role in the nomination
and selection of Advisory Committee for Reproductive Health Drugs
(ACRHD) members. 271 Many individuals appointed by the Commissioner
to the Committee were inexperienced and underqualified.272 These
members were selected not for their qualifications but to reach what the
Office of the Commissioner referred to as a “balance of opinion” on the
ACRHD, thus stacking the committee with individuals who were active in
Right to Life antiabortion causes. 273
Plan B’s sponsor reported its actual use study data to the FDA, showing
that “the frequency of unprotected sex did not increase, condom use did not
decrease, and the overall use of effective contraception did not
decrease.” 274 In light of these results, the Advisory Committee voted
overwhelmingly in favor of approving Plan B for over the counter (OTC)
use without age or point-of-sale restrictions. 275 Though the FDA had
followed the Advisory Committee in every OTC switch decision between
1994 and 2004, it denied the Plan B switch request. 276 Testimony of FDA
officials showed that Dr. McClellan, the Acting Deputy Commissioner, did
not make the decision on his own. The White House had made it clear to
him that an OTC Plan B would be politically unpopular and that the public
“needed to have the message that we were taking adolescents and
reproductive issues seriously.” 277 Dr. Houn, the director of the FDA office
that evaluated Plan B, testified that Dr. Janet Woodcock told her that a
denial was necessary “to appease the [present] administration’s
constituents,” and then later this could be approved. 278 Under political
pressure from the White House, the FDA in May 2004 issued a nonapprovable letter for Plan B, citing the lack of age restrictions. 279

269. Id. at 527.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 527–28.
272. Id. at 527.
273. Id. at 528.
274. Id.
275. Id. The committee voted twenty-three to four in favor of a recommendation to
approve Plan B for over-the-counter (OTC) status without age or point-of-sale restrictions.
Id. It also voted unanimously in favor of finding that Plan B is safe for OTC use and by a
vote of twenty-seven to one that the actual use study data could be generalized to the total
population of OTC Plan B users. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 529.
278. Id. at 530 (alterations in original).
279. There was also evidence that Dr. McClellan made the decision before FDA staff had
even completed its scientific reviews of the actual use data. Id.
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Shortly after the first supplemental new drug application was denied, the
Plan B sponsor amended its request to seek OTC sale of Plan B to women
sixteen and older who presented a valid identification to the pharmacist, and
prescription-only sales for women fifteen and younger. 280 Although many
FDA scientists found the age restriction to be unwarranted, the FDA
delayed its decision beyond the normal 180-day time frame. 281 Acting
Commissioner Crawford had removed Dr. Steven Galson’s authority to
make the switch decision, effectively freezing the review process for over
seven months. 282 In light of the FDA’s handling of the Plan B switch
application, Dr. Susan Wood, the Assistant Commissioner and Director of
the FDA Office of Women’s Health, resigned, as did Dr. Frank Davidoff, a
member of the FDA’s Non-Prescription Drug Advisory Committee. 283 On
August 24, 2006, the FDA approved non-prescription use of Plan B only for
women eighteen and older. 284
An investigation by the Government Accountability Office found four
irregularities in the agency’s decision process. 285 First, the Directors of the
Offices of Drug Evaluation, who are normally responsible for deciding on
the application, disagreed with the decision and refused to sign the nonapproval letter.286 Second, FDA’s senior leadership was heavily involved
in the process, which was unusual for switch applications. 287 Third, it was
unclear whether the decision was made before or after the reviews of the
application were completed; high-level management told the reviewing
bodies that the application would be denied before reviews were
complete. 288 Fourth, the rationale for the decision—concern for adolescents
engaging in unsafe sexual behavior—was unusual because behavioral
factors normally are not considered in switch decisions. 289
In March 2009, Judge Edward R. Korman of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The judge
concluded that the “FDA’s decision was not the result of good faith and
reasoned agency decision-making.” 290 He cited “repeated and unreasonable
delays, pressure emanating from the White House, and the obvious
connection between the confirmation process of two FDA Commissioners
and the timing of the FDA’s decisions.” 291 The court also found that the
FDA departed significantly from its normal procedures for switch
applications and did so for implausible reasons and without sufficient
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 531.
Id. at 534.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 536.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. DECISION PROCESS TO DENY
INITIAL APPLICATION FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETING OF THE EMERGENCY
CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL 19 (2005).
286. Id. at 19–20.
287. Id. at 20–21.
288. Id. at 21–22.
289. Id. at 22–29.
290. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
291. Id.
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evidence to support its decision.292 The court concluded that the “FDA
simply has not come forward with an adequate explanation [for the
departure], nor has it presented any evidence to rebut plaintiffs’ showing
that it acted in bad faith and in response to political pressure.”293 Declaring
that the record was so clear on one issue, the court took the unusual step of
ordering the agency to make Plan B available without prescription to
women seventeen and older. It remanded the rest of the case and ordered
FDA to reconsider whether any age restrictions on non-prescription use are
appropriate. 294
6. The Justice Department and Domestic Surveillance
Another incident from the Bush Administration that subsequently has
come to light illustrates the power of agency officials who threaten to resign
when they believe the White House is asking them to do something illegal
or improper. In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
President Bush signed a secret order in 2002 that authorized the National
Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance on
United States citizens and foreign nationals in the United States.295 The
order allowed NSA to gather signals intelligence from communications
involving U.S. citizens without first obtaining a warrant or court order.296
The White House’s purported basis for this surveillance program was the
President’s power to authorize the use of “‘all necessary and appropriate
force’” to engage with those responsible for the September 11 attacks, 297
which required that NSA not wait to obtain warrants at the risk of losing
vital information.298 Every forty-five days the Department of Justice (DOJ)
had to review the program to ensure its legality, and, if the DOJ certified
the program, the President had to sign an order to renew it.299 When the
program was reviewed beginning in late 2003, the review process dragged
beyond the forty-five-day timeline as the White House battled with cabinet
members and top DOJ officials over the program’s legality. 300 President
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 550.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 550.
Richard M. Pious, Warrantless Surveillance and the Warrantless Presidency, in
UNITARY EXECUTIVE, supra note 260, at 163, 163; Dan Eggen, Bush Authorized Domestic
Spying, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. This surveillance program was justified by a
classified legal opinion authored by John C. Yoo, the former deputy in the Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel. See Eggen, supra. The program permitted the NSA to
monitor emails and calls between the United States and locations overseas if one party was
believed to be linked to a terrorist group. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales Hospital
Episode Detailed, WASH. POST, May 16, 2007, at A1.
296. Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Memorandum on
the Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign
Intelligence Information 1 (Jan 5, 2006).
297. Id. at 2 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001)).
298. Eggen, supra note 295.
299. Barton Gellman, Conflict Over Spying Led White House to Brink, WASH. POST, Sept.
14, 2008, at A1.
300. See GELLMAN, supra note 198, at 287–92.
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Bush renewed the program on March 11, 2004, but less than one week later
he retracted his renewal and permitted the DOJ to amend the program.301
President Bush changed course when he realized that by renewing the
program without DOJ certification he would face mass resignations of
officials in the upper echelon of his Administration. 302
Vice President Dick Cheney played the leading role in the execution of
the program from the start. Cheney chaired surveillance program briefings
for select members of Congress while his counsel, David Addington,
drafted the original authorization letter signed by President Bush. 303
Addington worked with Cheney in an effort to persuade DOJ officials to
certify the legality of the program. 304 When Cheney briefed members of
Congress on the program, he reassured them that the NSA’s top law and
ethics officers approved of the program. 305 In reality, Joel Brenner, NSA’s
inspector general, and Vito Potenza, NSA’s acting general counsel, were
simply acting in reliance on the renewal orders certified by the Attorney
General and signed by President Bush, not on their own independent
analysis of the legality of the program. 306 Meanwhile, Jack L. Goldsmith,
the Assistant Attorney General for DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
and one of the few officials who had been briefed on the program, 307
warned of major legal problems throughout the surveillance program’s
review process. 308
Upon reviewing the surveillance program, Goldsmith determined that it
was “the biggest legal mess” he had ever seen in his life.309 Goldsmith
wanted Deputy Attorney General James Comey to be consulted about the
program as well, and Addington and White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales reluctantly agreed on the condition that Goldsmith give his
definitive answer on the program’s legality by the March 11, 2004
deadline. 310 Goldsmith and Patrick Philbin, an OLC lawyer, began
working on bringing the program into compliance with the law, but
concluded that certain parts of the program had no legal support.311 Comey
then met with Scott Muller, General Counsel at the CIA, who agreed with
Goldsmith and Philbin’s conclusions. 312 On March 4, Comey presented the
findings to Attorney General John Ashcroft, who said that he would not
sign the order to renew the surveillance program unless the White House
301. Id. at 313–26.
302. Id. at 319–21.
303. Id. at 143, 153–54, 279.
304. Id. at 282–98.
305. Gellman, supra note 299.
306. Id. In fact, neither official had even seen the DOJ’s classified legal analysis
authored by Yoo. See GELLMAN, supra note 198, at 277–81.
307. Gellman, supra note 299. Addington briefed Goldsmith on the program shortly after
he took his post in DOJ in October 2003. Id.
308. Barton Gellman, Cheney Shielded Bush from Crisis, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at
A1.
309. Gellman, supra note 299.
310. Id.
311. See GELLMAN, supra note 198, at 289–94.
312. Id. at 293.
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agreed to significant changes in it. 313 The next day, Ashcroft entered the
hospital for treatment of acute gallstone pancreatitis, and Comey became
the Acting Attorney General. 314
On March 6, Goldsmith informed Gonzales and Addington that DOJ
would not certify the program. 315 Two days before the program was set to
expire Cheney still had yet to inform President Bush about the brewing
controversy. 316 Gonzalez made one last effort to convince Goldsmith to
reconsider, but Goldsmith refused. 317 That evening, Cheney convened a
meeting at which he and Addington attempted once more to persuade
Comey and Goldsmith to certify the program, but Comey refused to certify
it, despite its importance, because it lacked legal support.318
On March 10, the day before the surveillance program was set to expire,
officials engaged in both sides of the battle made their final moves. Comey
checked to see whether Frances Fragos Townsend, President Bush’s deputy
National Security Advisor for combating terrorism, was briefed on the
program and learned, to his surprise, that she was not. 319 Other notable
officials left out of the loop were Homeland Security Advisor John Gordon,
Deputy National Security Advisor Steven J. Hadley, Homeland Security
Secretary Tom Ridge, 320 and Bush’s chief political advisor Karl Rove.321
Cheney convened a meeting attended by Hayden, Gonzales, four ranking
members of the House, four ranking members of the Senate, and chairmen
and vice chairmen of intelligence committees.322 Gonzales later testified
that there was a “consensus in the room” to push forward with the
surveillance program, but this statement was disputed by participants from
both parties, and Goldsmith and Comey refused to certify the program.323
White House officials made a last-ditch effort to secure the DOJ’s
certification. With less than twenty-four hours before the surveillance
program was to expire, Gonzales and Card raced to George Washington
University Medical Center in an effort to obtain Ashcroft’s signature.324
Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin rushed to the hospital as well, arriving
before the White House officials. Ashcroft managed to sit up and not only
refused to sign the certification—he also told Gonzales and Card that he

313. Id.
314. Gellman, supra note 299.
315. Id.
316. GELLMAN, supra note 198, at 296.
317. Id. at 294.
318. Gellman, supra note 299. Also in attendance at the meeting were Andrew Card,
NSA Director Mike Hayden, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, and John McLaughlin of the
CIA. Id.
319. Id. Comey made this determination by asking Townsend whether she recognized the
classified code name of the program; she did not. Id.
320. Id.
321. Gellman, supra note 308. Although National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice
had clearance, Cheney did not invite her to significant meetings. Id.
322. Id. President Bush was not involved at this point in time. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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“never should have certified the [surveillance] program in the first
place.” 325
By this point, Goldsmith and Comey had resolved to resign should the
President renew the program without DOJ certification, and several other
high-ranking officials were reportedly prepared to follow suit.326 Several
lawyers would leave DOJ if Comey quit; 327 FBI General Counsel Valerie
Caproni and the CIA General Counsel Scott Mueller told colleagues that
they would resign if the program were reauthorized; and Assistant Attorney
General Christopher Wray said that he would resign if Comey resigned.328
Even Ashcroft was prepared to resign. 329 But President Bush, away on the
campaign trail, was unaware of the impending mass resignations.330
Addington reached a “solution” to the threat to the surveillance
program’s survival by editing the March 11 renewal order so that in place
of the Attorney General’s signature line there was a line for Alberto
Gonzales’s signature. 331 This switch in authorization essentially allowed
the President to rely on his own authority to certify the program as lawful.
President Bush signed the order but did agree, at Condoleezza Rice’s
recommendation, to meet with Comey to discuss the controversy. President
Bush expressed concern that Comey was “raising this at the last minute,”
signaling that he had not been informed of the resignation plans or that
Comey and others had been voicing their objections to the surveillance
program for months. 332 It was clear that the White House would have to

325. Id. Ashcroft further stated that the White House officials “drew the circle so tight”
that he could not receive the advice that he needed. Id.
326. Id. Both men drafted resignation letters. Goldsmith instructed his deputy, Ed
Whelan, to draft his resignation letter immediately after the hospital meeting. GELLMAN,
supra note 198, at 305. Comey reiterated in his resignation letter that he had promised at his
confirmation hearing that he “would never be a part of something that [he] believe[d] to be
fundamentally wrong” and that the DOJ had been unable to right the wrong in this case. Id.
at 313–14. Thus, he must “do the right thing” and resign. Letter from James B. Comey,
Deputy Att’y Gen., to President George W. Bush (Mar. 16, 2004) (unsent), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/cheney/doc-comey-resig.html.
327. Comey testified that he believed that a large portion of his staff was set to resign.
Written Questions from Sen. Charles E. Schumer to James B. Comey 1 (May 15, 2007),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/cheney/doccomey-senate.html [hereinafter Questions].
328. Gellman, supra note 308. Caproni was bound by the FBI’s central mission—to
“uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States,” which she could not do if she
were to enforce a program that the DOJ refused to certify as legal. Gellman, supra note 299.
329. Eggen & Kane, supra note 295.
330. Gellman, supra note 308. Cheney, Addington, Card, and Gonzales were all aware of
the potential resignations. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. Mueller also met privately with the President and informed him that the FBI
could not participate in operations that DOJ deemed to be criminal violations of the law, so
he would be forced to resign. Id. Moreover, Comey later testified that DOJ’s views on the
legality of the surveillance program, including the view that neither Comey nor Ashcroft
would certify the program, were communicated orally and in writing in the weeks or months
preceding the March 10 meeting. Written Questions to Former Deputy Att’y Gen. James B.
Comey Submitted by Sen. Patrick Leahy 2 (May 22, 2007), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/cheney/doc-comey-senate.html.
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backtrack in order to avoid a mass resignation and a certain political
scandal.
One week after signing the order renewing the surveillance program,
President Bush amended the directive by placing legal certification
authority back on the DOJ and telling Comey “to do what [the DOJ] thinks
needs to be done.” 333 Much of the program remained the same, 334 though
Comey refused to specify whether the program was the same after 2004 and
what, if any, changes had been made. 335 Despite the President’s
backtracking, as of 2007 Gonzales continued to defend the program the
DOJ refused to certify. 336
G. Regulatory Review and Presidential Directives Under President Obama
1. Regulatory Review During the Obama Administration
From the first days of his Administration, President Barack Obama made
it clear that he would play an active role in seeking to mobilize the federal
bureaucracy to achieve his policy ends. Moving swiftly to reverse certain
Bush Administration policies, on his first full day in office he revoked
Executive Order 13,233, which the Bush Administration had used to block
the release of presidential records. 337 Nine days later, he revoked the two
executive orders President Bush had issued to modify the Clinton
Administration’s regulatory review program, 338 and he announced that he
would develop a new regulatory review program after requesting public
comment on how a new executive order should structure the process.339
Obama endorsed the concept of presidential review of agency action:
“While recognizing the expertise and authority of executive branch
departments and agencies, I also believe that, if properly conducted,
centralized review is both legitimate and appropriate as a means of
promoting regulatory goals.” 340 The President requested his OMB
Director, “in consultation with representatives of regulatory agencies, as
333. Gellman, supra note 308. President Bush sent this message to Comey through
Mueller. Id.
334. Id.
335. Questions, supra note 327, at 1.
336. Eggen & Kane, supra note 295.
337. Exec. Order No. 13,489, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 191, 193 (2010). For a discussion of
Executive Order 13,233 see Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 1012–13.
338. Exec. Order No. 13,497, §§ 1–2, 3 C.F.R. 218, 218 (2010) (revoking Exec. Order
13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008), and Exec. Order 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003)); see supra notes
197, 213–15 and accompanying text (detailing how Executive Orders 13,258 and 13,422
modified Executive Order 13,233). Curiously, on March 4, 2009, OMB Director Peter R.
Orszag issued a memorandum “clarifying” that the President did not intend to revoke
OIRA’s authority to review guidance documents. Peter R. Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt.
& Budget, Memorandum for the Heads & Acting Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Mar.
4, 2009) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). He based this claim on the assertion that
OMB occasionally had reviewed agency guidance documents prior to the issuance of
Executive Order 13,422. Id.
339. Barack H. Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan.
30, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 (Feb. 3, 2009).
340. Id.
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appropriate, to produce within 100 days a set of recommendations for a new
Executive Order on Federal regulatory review.”341
On February 26, 2009, OMB published a request for “public comments
on how to improve the process and principles governing regulation.”342
Comments particularly were solicited on:
•

The relationship between OIRA and the agencies;

•

Disclosure and transparency;

•

Encouraging public participation in agency regulatory processes;

•

The role of cost-benefit analysis;

•

The role of distributional considerations, fairness, and concern
for the interests of future generations;

•

Methods of ensuring that regulatory review does not produce
undue delay;

•

The role of the behavioral sciences in formulating regulatory
policy; and

•

The best tools for achieving public goals through the regulatory
process. 343

The public comment request emphasized that executive orders are not
subject to the notice and comment procedures of the APA, but it stated that
public comment was useful due to the “unusually high level of public
interest.” 344
The public comment request resulted in 183 comments from academia,
trade interest groups, public policy and interest groups, and private
citizens. 345 Comments received from the agencies were not made public.
While many observers expected the Obama Administration to move
quickly to establish its own regulatory review program, it was not until
January 18, 2011 that the President issued Executive Order 13,563.346 The
executive order leaves all the elements of the Clinton regulatory review
program largely intact, while modifying it to give priority also to weeding
out obsolete regulations and to improving existing rules that are insufficient
to achieve regulatory objectives.347 Among the significant themes
embedded in the new executive order are the value of learning from prior
experience with regulatory policy; the importance of adopting an even341. Id.
342. Office of Management and Budget, Federal Regulatory Review—Request for
Comments, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819 (Feb. 26, 2009).
343. Id. at 8819.
344. Id.
345. See Public Comments on OMB Recommendations for a New Executive Order on
Regulatory Review, REGINFO.GOV, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/
publicComments.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
346. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
347. Id. § 6, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3822; see Barack Obama, Opinion, Toward a 21st-Century
Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, at A17 (stating that the administration is
“making it our mission to root out regulations that conflict, that are not worth the cost, or
that are just plain dumb”).
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handed, results-oriented approach to regulation; and the value of flexibility
in approaches to regulations, embracing default rules, warnings and
informational strategies. 348 Equity, dignity, fairness, and the distributional
consequences of regulation are identified as important considerations to
supplement evaluations of regulatory costs and benefits. 349
On the question of presidential directive authority, the Obama executive
order disclaims authority to displace decision making entrusted by statute to
agency heads. Section 7(b) of the executive order specifies that “[n]othing
in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) authority
granted by law to a department or agency, or the head thereof.”350 Thus,
President Obama continues the tradition of eschewing directive authority in
the executive order outlining his regulatory review program.
2. Presidential Directives During the Obama Administration
From the first days of his Administration, President Obama issued
directives to agencies asking them to reconsider Bush Administration
policies. Six days after taking office, President Obama signaled that he
intended to effect significant changes in the nation’s environmental
policies. On January 26, 2009, Obama issued separate memoranda to the
EPA Administrator 351 and to both the Secretary of Transportation and the
National
Highway
Traffic
Safety
Administration
(NHTSA)
Administrator. 352 These memoranda directed both the EPA Administrator
to reconsider former Administrator Johnson’s decision to deny California a
waiver to set statewide GHG emissions standards for new motor vehicles 353
and the Secretary of Transportation and NHTSA Administrator to
promulgate stronger fuel efficiency standards under the 2007 Energy
Independence and Security Act. 354 Both memoranda served as significant
reversals of Bush Administration policies.355
In his first two years in office, President Obama issued seventy-four
Executive Orders. 356 Other Obama directives also addressed energy and
environmental issues. On February 5, 2009, President Obama asked the
Department of Energy to enact higher appliance efficiency standards under
the 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the 2005 Energy Policy

348. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 4, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3822.
349. Id. § 1, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3821.
350. Id. § 7(b), 76 Fed. Reg. at 3822.
351. Memorandum, supra note 234.
352. Barack Obama, Memorandum, The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
(Jan. 26, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4907 (Jan. 28, 2009).
353. Memorandum, supra note 234, at 20.
354. Obama, supra note 352.
355. Obama Moves To Revise Fuel Efficiency Policies, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 26, 2009,
1:20 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/environment/jan-june09/fuel_01-26.html.
356. Barack Obama Executive Orders Disposition Tables, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/obama.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2011).
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Act. 357 On March 3, 2009, the President again acted to reverse Bush
Administration policy, 358 requesting federal agencies to resume full
scientific review of activities that could harm endangered species.359
President Obama also directed agencies to shield government scientific
research from political influence.360 He created a working group to design
biofuel policy while asking the Secretary of Agriculture to develop
investment mechanisms for biofuels. 361 In June 2009 the President issued a
memorandum creating a taskforce aimed at designing and implementing
comprehensive national policy to protect oceans, coasts, and the Great
Lakes. 362
On October 5, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,514,
which requires federal agencies to set targets to control their greenhouse gas
emissions. 363 The Order also directs agencies to increase energy efficiency,
reduce waste, conserve water, reduce fleet petroleum consumption, support
sustainable communities, and utilize government purchasing power to
In response to the
support environmentally friendly products.364
catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the President issued a
memorandum to improve fuel efficiency 365 and also issued an executive
order establishing the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 366 The memorandum ordered federal
agencies to develop fuel economy and emissions standards for medium and
heavy-duty trucks for model years 2014–18, 367 the first ever efficiency
targets for these classes of trucks. 368 The memorandum also called for
another round of fuel efficiency and emissions targets for passenger cars
and light-duty trucks starting in 2017. 369 Executive Order 13,543
established the President’s oil spill commission and directed it to analyze

357. Barack Obama, Memorandum, Appliance Efficiency Standards (Feb. 5, 2009), 74
Fed. Reg. 6537 (Feb. 9, 2009).
358. Reversing Bush Rule, Obama Resumes Safeguards for Endangered Species, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Mar. 3, 2009, 5:05 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/science/janjune09/speciesrule_03-03.html.
359. Barack Obama, Memorandum, The Endangered Species Act (Mar. 3, 2009), 74 Fed.
Reg. 9753 (Mar. 6, 2009).
360. Barack Obama, Memorandum, Scientific Integrity (Mar. 9, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg.
10,671 (Mar. 11, 2009).
361. Id.
362. Barack Obama, Memorandum, National Policy for the Oceans, Our Coasts, and the
Great Lakes (June 12, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 28,591 (June 17, 2009).
363. Exec. Order No. 13,514, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 248, 249 (2010).
364. Id.
365. Barack Obama, Memorandum, Improving Energy Security, American
Competitiveness and Job Creation, and Environmental Protection Through a Transformation
of Our Nation’s Fleet of Cars and Trucks (May 21, 2010), 75 Fed. Reg. 29,399 (May 26,
2010).
366. Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 26, 2010).
367. Obama, supra note 365, § 1; U.S. Sets Sights on Auto Fuel Efficiency for 2017,
REUTERS (May 21, 2010, 11:46 AM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/21/us-autosfuel-idUSTRE64J75120100521.
368. U.S. Sets Sights on Auto Fuel Efficiency for 2017, supra note 367.
369. Obama, supra note 365.
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the causes of the oil spill and to develop policies to prevent future spills
from offshore drilling. 370
President Obama also employed a large number of advisors with
responsibility for coordinating certain policy areas. Responding to charges
that these “czars,” who are not subject to Senate confirmation, had too
much authority, the White House argued that they are not intended to
“supplant or replace” responsibilities delegated by law to executive
agencies. Instead, their duties are to “help coordinate” agency efforts and to
assist in devising “comprehensive solutions to complex problems.” 371
IV. DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Arguments that presidential directive authority is constitutionally
mandated are unconvincing, 372 as even the most ardent proponents of the
unitary executive must acknowledge. 373 Calabresi and Yoo’s efforts to
uncover historical roots for directive authority collide with a historical
record that is almost entirely to the contrary. They claim that “[p]erhaps the
most dramatic assertion” of directive authority is the establishment of
presidential programs requiring OMB review of budgetary and regulatory
initiatives. 374 Yet, as discussed above, each of the executive orders issued
over the last thirty years to establish a new program of presidential
oversight of agency action has expressly disclaimed directive authority.375
This powerfully undermines not only the argument that presidential practice
supports directive authority as a constitutional imperative but also the
suggestion that statutes granting agency heads regulatory authority should
be interpreted to reflect implicit congressional intent to give the President
directive authority.
In subsequent work Calabresi and Yoo maintain that their book
“probably [does] not pay sufficient attention” to President Clinton’s

370. Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397.
371. Letter from Gregory B. Craig, Counsel to the President, to Senator Russell D.
Feingold 3 (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/wpcontent/uploads/2009/10/feingoldletter.pdf.
372. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those
Who Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G.
Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593 (2010); Peter L. Strauss,
Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
696 (2007).
373. Christopher S. Yoo, Symposium, Presidential Power in Historical Perspective:
Reflections on Calabresi and Yoo’s The Unitary Executive—Foreword, 12 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 241, 246 (2010) (“Several commentators have observed that our book offers a stronger
showing of presidential assertions of the power to remove executive officials and a weaker
showing of the President’s authority to direct executive officials in their actions.”).
374. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 421. Moreover, all of the other examples they
cite of Presidents directing subordinates occurred long before the dawn of the regulatory
state when statutes routinely specified that regulatory decisions were to be made by agency
heads.
375. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 7(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 21, 2011);
Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 9, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(f)(3), 3
C.F.R. 127, 130 (1982).
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expanded use of presidential directives, as outlined by Elena Kagan.376
These instances are discussed below, but it is worth noting for now that
Kagan herself concedes that any directive authority allegedly asserted by
President Clinton was not derived from the Constitution. 377 At best,
Calabresi and Yoo’s history suggests that nearly all Presidents have tried to
influence regulatory decisions by executive agencies, indicating perhaps
that they would like to have directive authority, but that is a far cry from
establishing that the President actually has directive authority, or even that
any President genuinely believed that the Constitution mandates it.378
Given that the Constitution says so little about executive agencies, leaving
it largely to Congress to fill in the details, it is not surprising that the unitary
executive theory has been overwhelmingly rejected by scholars, particularly
since the actions of the first Congress are at odds with it. 379
Proponents of the unitary executive theory also claim that because the
President has authority to remove executive officers at will, it makes little
or no difference whether the President has directive authority because he
can remove any officer who resists his direction. Yet the historical record
demonstrates that, despite the President’s broad removal authority, the
answer to the separate directive authority question matters greatly. It
determines whether agency heads have a legal entitlement to refuse to
comply with a presidential directive when it directs them to act in a way
they believe is illegal, improper, or unwise. The historical record
powerfully supports the notion that the absence of directive authority
provides an important check on potentially egregious abuses of presidential
power. Even if the President’s removal authority enables him to fire the
heads of executive agencies at will, requiring him to fire a resistant officer
and replace him with an officer who will take the action he desires
invariably has substantial political costs.
Directive authority to override Congress’s choice of regulatory decision
maker also would undermine the U.S. Senate’s advice and consent power
over the confirmation of agency heads, an important constitutional
qualification on the President’s appointment power established by Article
II, Section 2 of the Constitution. The process of confirmation of agency
heads now frequently is used to obtain assurances that presidential
nominees will implement their statutory responsibilities with some degree
of independence from the President’s political preferences.380 If the
376. See Yoo, supra note 373, at 246–47.
377. Kagan, supra note 7, at 2251, 2320.
378. Mark Tushnet suggests that theories of the unitary executive have evolved
historically in three stages that correspond remarkably to the desires of whatever
administration is in power. Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the
Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313 (2010).
379. See Percival, Presidential Management, supra note 2, at 975–76 (discussing how the
first Congress “even while acknowledging the President’s broad executive powers, . . .
entrusted agency heads with certain decisionmaking responsibilities, and . . . sought to
preserve some independence for agency heads in their performance of those
responsibilities”).
380. See id. at 1005–06.
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President had directive authority over decisions entrusted by statute to
agency heads, it would make little difference whether he appointed officials
acceptable to the Senate because he always could override their judgments.
As discussed in the historical update above, time after time when White
House officials tried to persuade agency heads to make decisions for
reasons that deviated from statutory commands, agency heads have resisted.
From White House requests for EPA to drop its first enforcement actions
against Republican campaign contributors 381 to orders seeking to
countermand climate science,382 the absence of directive authority has
afforded the moral high ground to agency officials who are willing take a
stand when the White House crosses the line. This is well demonstrated by
the refusal of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney
General William Ruckelshaus to fire Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
when President Nixon was trying to avoid further inquiry into the
Watergate scandal.383 Most recently, the threat of mass resignations by top
Bush Administration officials over the President’s domestic surveillance
program forced the administration to make substantial modifications in the
program. 384
To be sure, the absence of presidential directive authority does not mean
that the President is unlikely to prevail when he disagrees with agency
heads over regulatory policy matters. At will removal authority is a
powerful tool that dictates that few agency heads will defy the President.
But this means that such defiance will only occur when it is a matter so
essential that it rises to the level of importance that former FDA
Commissioner David Kessler dubbed a “resignable” event.385
Given the President’s removal power, agency heads frequently agree to
comply voluntarily with White House directives, even if the President does
not have directive authority. Because agency decisions must be consistent
with the underlying regulatory statutes and supported by evidence in the
administrative record, if the White House dictates a result that is
inconsistent with the regulatory statute or the rulemaking record, the
decision is vulnerable to being overturned in court, as occurred in Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson 386 and in New York v. Reilly. 387 If
the agency head is willing to embrace the decision as his or her own, the
fact that the decision was the product of OMB or, in a rare case, presidential
persuasion is unlikely to affect its chances of surviving judicial review.
As discussed above, there are strong reasons to believe that EPA
Administrator Stephen Johnson dutifully complied with numerous White
381. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
382. See supra notes 228–66 and accompanying text.
383. See the discussion of the “Saturday Night Massacre” in Percival, Presidential
Management, supra note 2, at 1004.
384. See text accompanying notes 295–330, supra.
385. KESSLER, supra note 168, at 69.
386. 796 F.2d 1479, 1481, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reversing and remanding decision by
OSHA’s head to carry out OMB’s last-minute directive to delete short-term exposure limit
for ethylene oxide without any support or explanation in the administrative record).
387. 969 F.2d 1147, 1148–50 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (remanding to EPA).
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House directives to quash regulatory initiatives. This explains why he did
not propose a finding that GHG emissions endanger public health and
welfare and why he weakened other environmental standards presented to
him for decision. So long as the agency head insists, as Johnson did, that
the decision is his own, and not that of the White House, the decision is not
legally vulnerable unless it is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law or
procedure, or insufficiently supported in the administrative record.
Yet agency decisions reached at the behest of White House officials are
likely to be more vulnerable to legal challenges than are other regulations
because regulatory review often emphasizes factors that are not made
relevant by the underlying regulatory statute. This is well illustrated by the
USDA’s efforts to have President George H.W. Bush require the FDA to
adopt nutritional guidelines that would protect the economic interests of the
domestic meat industry. The President was informed that if he tried to
direct the FDA to promulgate more meat-friendly nutrition labels, that “the
Department can’t just salute smartly and go execute whatever decision” he
made because the record would not support it. 388 If the President were able
to direct a decision for political reasons that would require an agency to
manufacture a new administrative record, it would undermine the purposes
of conducting an informal notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to the
requirements of the APA. 389
It is extremely rare, however, that parties seeking judicial review of
agency action will be able to prove that the President or his staff overrode
an agency head’s decision. But it is not impossible. Vice President
Quayle’s Council on Competitiveness was so proud of its rejection of
EPA’s proposed ban on incineration of lead acid batteries and the agency’s
incinerator recycling requirement that it publicly boasted that it had vetoed
EPA’s decision. 390 One participant in the Council’s closed meeting told the
press that the real reason for the decision was a “strong sense that they
needed to give business something” because of “concern that we lost our
commitment to deregulation.” 391 Thus it is not surprising that the D.C.
Circuit struck down EPA’s failure to ban incineration of lead acid batteries

388. KESSLER, supra note 168, at 68.
389. Moreover, as Kevin Stack has ably argued, decisions that can be shown to be the
product of presidential prodding should be less likely to qualify for Chevron deference from
a reviewing court. Stack, supra note 20, at 307. But cf. Kagan, supra note 7, at 2376 (arguing
for linking deference to presidential involvement given the President’s more direct electoral
accountability); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008) (questioning whether insulating an agency from
the influence of elected officials reduces the agency’s responsiveness to preferences of
political majorities).
390. President’s Council on Competitiveness Fact Sheet, supra note 149.
391. The Council on Competitiveness’s fact sheet cited three reasons for its decision: (1)
the recycling requirement was not a performance standard, (2) the regulation interfered with
local government decision making, and (3) it was not cost-beneficial under Executive Order
12,291. Id.; see David Littell, Note, The Omission of Materials Separation Requirements
from Air Standards for Municipal Waste Incinerators: EPA’s Commitment to Recycling Up
in Flames, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 601 (1991); Michael Weisskopf, EPA Proposal on
Recycling Is Trashed, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1990, at A17.
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as insufficiently supported by the record. 392 Decisions based on grounds
divorced from the statutory criteria are vulnerable when subjected to
judicial review.
A federal district court’s invalidation of FDA’s refusal to approve the
Plan B emergency contraceptive for use by women under eighteen also
demonstrates that when political interference can be shown, agency
decisions will get less judicial deference.393 This is consistent with
Professor Stack’s argument that when the statute does not designate the
President as the regulatory decision maker, decisions dictated by him are
not entitled to the same level of deference on judicial review. 394
Legal scholars who have considered the directive authority issue have
long agreed on one important point—the President cannot claim directive
authority over decisions reached by formal adjudicatory procedures.395
This was confirmed when the Ninth Circuit upheld application of the
APA’s ban on ex parte contacts in formal adjudicatory hearings to the
deliberations of the inter-agency “God squad” considering an exemption
from the ESA during the George H.W. Bush Administration. 396 The court
concluded that “Congress clearly has the authority” to “create the
392. New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The court did note that
the fact that EPA went along with the Competitiveness Council’s decision “does not mean
that EPA failed to exercise its own expertise in promulgating the final rules.” Id. at 1152. As
Michael Herz notes: “Although the general understanding, and my own belief, is that EPA
Administrator William Reilly was forced to cave in to White House commands on the
incinerator issue, officially the agency and the Council reached consensus, with the latter
convincing Reilly of the error of his views.” Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive
Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 224 n.28 (1993); see also
Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources; Municipal Waste Combustors, 56
Fed. Reg. 5488, 5497 (Feb. 11, 1991). Herz notes that EPA General Counsel Don Elliott
later testified: “The final decision [regarding the incinerator new source performance
standard] was very clearly made by Bill Reilly, rather than by the Council on
Competitiveness.” Herz, supra, at 225 n.28 (alteration in original).
393. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 544–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
394. Stack, supra note 20, at 307.
395. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR
BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 150 (1962) (“Everyone, including the presidential
activists, seems to agree that ‘the outcome of any particular adjudicatory matter is . . . as
much beyond his [the President’s] concern . . . as the outcome of any cause pending in the
courts . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY
AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 33 (1960))); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and
Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 454 n.11 (1979) (noting “White House efforts
to forbid staff interference with agency adjudication”); Kagan, supra note 7, at 2306;
Emmette S. Redford, The President and the Regulatory Commissions, 44 TEX. L. REV. 288
(1965). (“The President and all other executive officials should avoid any ex parte statement
or communication concerning the application of law or policy by commissions to particular
concerns or individuals.” (emphasis omitted)); Peter M. Flanigan, Memorandum, Contacts
Between the White House and the Independent Regulatory Agencies (May 21, 1969),
reprinted in In re ITT Continental Baking Co., 82 F.T.C. 1188, 1191 (1973)). Although
Calabresi and Yoo do not focus on agency adjudications, they note that during the Nixon
Administration the Ash Council proposed abolishing most independent agencies and
transferring adjudicative functions previously performed by them to an Administrative Court
of the United States. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 5, at 351.
396. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1536 (9th
Cir. 1993); see also text accompanying notes 154–66, supra.
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Committee as a quasi-judicial adjudicatory body subject to the statutory
restrictions that the APA imposes on such institutions” in order to “ensure
the independence of the agency from presidential control.”397 When the
D.C. Circuit endorsed presidential involvement in regulatory decisions in
Sierra Club v. Costle, 398 Judge Wald was careful to distinguish between
presidential contacts with agency heads in informal rulemakings (the
proceeding at issue there) and such contacts in formal adjudications, as the
Ninth Circuit noted. 399 In Sierra Club, Judge Wald observed that even the
most enthusiastic endorsement of presidential power over agencies in Myers
v. United States was qualified with the statement that its reasoning did not
apply to adjudications. 400
In her account of President Clinton’s energetic efforts to influence
agencies, Elena Kagan notes that the “only mode of administrative action
from which Clinton shrank was adjudication.” 401 Kagan reports that
Clinton was careful to ensure that he never attempted “to exercise the
powers that a department head possesses over an agency’s on-the-record
determinations.” 402 She stresses that her argument for inferring presidential
directive authority from the regulatory statutes does not apply with respect
to adjudication because of the fundamentally different nature of such
proceedings and “the different purposes of participation in them.” 403 Citing
the dictum in Myers noted above, Kagan concludes that in the adjudication
context, “presidential participation in administration, of whatever form,
would contravene procedural norms and inject an inappropriate influence
into the resolution of controversies.” 404 This must “disallow the President
from disrupting or displacing the procedural, participatory requirements
associated with agency adjudication, thus preserving their ability to serve
their intended, special objectives.” 405
Yet, absent special procedural requirements specified in the underlying
regulatory statute, agencies generally have substantial discretion in
choosing between rulemaking and adjudication as a means for formulating
and implementing regulatory policy. 406 Because adjudications cannot be
397. Portland Audubon, 984 F.2d at 1547–48.
398. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
399. Portland Audubon, 984 F.2d at 1545 (“In fact, while the Costle court recognized that
political pressure from the President may not be inappropriate in informal rulemaking
proceedings, it acknowledged that the contrary is true in formal adjudications.”).
400. Id. at 407 n.527 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Judge Wald noted that statement from Myers that
“‘there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on . . . executive tribunals whose
decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President
can not in a particular case properly influence or control.’” Id. (quoting Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926)).
401. Kagan, supra note 7, at 2306.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 2362.
404. Id. at 2363.
405. Id.
406. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (“[T]he Board is not
precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and . . . the choice
between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board’s
discretion.”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made between
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the subjects of presidential directive authority under any of the theories that
support it, agencies can insulate themselves from presidential influence by
choosing to set policy through adjudication. For example, the National
Labor Relations Board did not conduct its first rulemaking until the late
1980s in part because agency officials wanted to insulate Board decisions
from political pressures. 407 Many regulatory agencies like the EPA rely
almost entirely on rulemaking to set policy, 408 but the fact that an agency
could escape presidential directive authority simply by addressing an issue
through adjudication undercuts the force of arguments for inferring
directive authority from statutes that permit agencies to choose between
rulemaking and adjudication.
CONCLUSION: DOES DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY MATTER?
Although it is unlikely that the debate over whether the President has the
legal authority to dictate the substance of regulatory decisions entrusted by
statute to agency heads ever will be definitively resolved, the view most
widely accepted by scholars is that the President does not. 409 Claims by
supporters of the unitary executive theory that presidential directive
authority is constitutionally required have scant support in the constitutional
text or relevant constitutional history. Arguments that presidential directive
authority should be inferred as implicit in statutes granting authority for
regulatory decisions to agency heads also conflict with the historical
evidence. The assumption that prevailed when regulatory statutes were
adopted was that the President did not have directive authority and the
executive orders establishing regulatory review by OMB expressly disclaim
such authority. The statutes themselves often divide decisonmaking
responsibilities between agency heads and the President or specify
circumstances under which the President can override agency decisions
(mixed agency-President delegations). These factors, and historical practice
since the dawn of the modern administrative state, provide strong support
for the notion that the President lacks directive authority unless Congress
expressly grants it to him.
Yet after four decades of experience with presidential oversight of
rulemaking and three decades of OMB review programs, regulatory review
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
407. WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 323 (3d ed.
2006); Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41
DUKE L.J. 274, 274–75 (1991).
408. But cf. Exec. Order No. 13,422, § 5(a), 3 C.F.R. 191, 193 (2008) (stating that
agencies, “[i]n consultation with OIRA may also consider whether to utilize formal
rulemaking procedures under 5 U.S.C. [§§] 556 and 557 [the provisions of the APA
governing formal adjudicatory proceedings] for the resolution of complex determinations”);
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Calls for Trial of Climate Science, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE (Aug.
26, 2009) http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/aug2009/2009-08-26-091.asp (reporting on
petition to EPA by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce for formal adjudicatory hearing to
determine whether emissions of greenhouse gases endanger public health or welfare under
the Clean Air Act).
409. See, e.g., Pierce, Jr., supra note 372, at 596–98; Strauss, supra note 372, at 759–60.
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has now become an accepted feature of the modern administrative state.
Recent administrations have been more active (and more successful) than
ever in efforts to persuade agency heads to pursue policies desired by the
White House. One important reason for their success is that these efforts
now extend far beyond the OMB review process embodied in the executive
orders. They include lobbying of agencies by greatly expanded White
House staffs and policy “czars” not subject to Senate confirmation, and
presidential directives telling agencies to address particular issues, while
carefully disclaiming authority to dictate the outcome. 410
For example, as Cary Coglianese writes about the Obama directive to
reconsider the denial of the California waiver, “President Obama’s
memorandum directing the agency was careful not to tell the EPA that it
must reverse itself and grant California’s waiver request; instead it simply
directed the agency to revisit the issue and take appropriate action.” 411 But
as Coglianese points out, “[t]here was no doubt, however, that Obama
wanted the waiver granted.” 412 Does this make the legal question of
directive authority irrelevant? History suggests otherwise.
One of President Reagan’s first acts in office was to establish a Task
Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by Vice President George H.W.
Bush. 413 The Task Force wrote to business leaders asking them to
nominate regulations that should be relaxed or repealed, much like
Congressman Darrell Issa’s committee is doing today in the newly
Republican-controlled House. 414 After oil industry executives nominated
EPA’s limits on lead in gasoline, the Reagan White House directed EPA
Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford to relax or repeal the lead limits.
EPA was allowed to propose abolishing these regulations without
conducting any cost-benefit analysis of them, on the grounds that the new
Executive Order 12,291 requiring such analysis only applied to new
regulations and not to the repeal of existing ones.415 But when subjected to
the notice-and-comment process for rulemaking under the APA, the
proposal to repeal the lead limits generated such a public outcry, including a
persuasive op-ed from President Reagan’s new friend, columnist George

410. See Pierce, Jr., supra note 372, at 600 (“The transparent systematic control
mechanisms used by OIRA to control the bureaucracy, however, are not now, and never
have been, the most important means through which Presidents, and presidential
subordinates who purport to be acting on behalf of the President, exercise control over the
bureaucracy. Largely invisible ad hoc White House jawboning is now, and always has been,
far more important in its impact on agency policy decisions.”); see also Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at
the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006) (an empirical study
finding that EPA is lobbied by myriad White House staffers outside of the OMB review
process).
411. Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate over
Law or Politics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 643–44 (2010).
412. Id. at 644.
413. Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 148.
414. Id.; Binyamin Appelbaum, G.O.P. Asks Businesses Which Rules To Rewrite, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, at B1.
415. Percival, Checks Without Balance, supra note 2, at 187–89.
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Will, 416 that the agency ultimately strengthened the lead limits. EPA later
phased out all lead from gasoline, perhaps the greatest success story for
public health in EPA history. Thus, even though Presidents have long
sought to influence agency rulemaking priorities, the White House cannot
legally dictate a particular regulatory outcome without the agency first
considering evidence submitted during a notice-and-comment procedure.
Agency heads ultimately may refuse to promulgate initiatives that would be
contrary to the agency’s statutory responsibility or else risk having them
invalidated in court.
As a practical matter the absence of presidential directive authority
means that Presidents must persuade agency heads when they want to
influence regulatory decisions entrusted by law to them. Given the
President’s authority to remove at will the principal officers of executive
agencies, it is easy for the President to persuade agency heads to do what he
wants. However, as discussed in detail above, history demonstrates that
removals have substantial political costs.417 In the rare case where a
presidential appointee so fundamentally disagrees with what the President
wants that he refuses to comply, the absence of a legal entitlement to direct
the appointee’s action provides a useful check on presidential abuses of
power, as this Article demonstrates.

416. George F. Will, The Poison Poor Children Breathe, reprinted in LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER 109 (Robert V. Percival & Dorothy C.
Alevizatos eds., 1997).
417. For a discussion of additional contemporary examples of the political costs of
removals, including President George W. Bush’s decision to remove seven U.S. attorneys,
see Pierce, Jr., supra note 372, at 607–10.

